ADAPTATION OF CUSTOMARY QUECHUA INDIGENOUS POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN THE FACE OF MODERN RESOURCE EXTRACTION: A CASE STUDY IN THE APURIMAC REGION OF THE ANDES OF PERU

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Abstract

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Yojana Miraya Oscco

This research focused on the forms and structure of customary political organization in Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes that extend from the villages to their associated migrant communities in the capital. As the mining industry has been expanding rapidly throughout the Andes in recent decades, describing the political organization of these remote communities is a key aspect of their negotiation practices with these external industries. This research was conducted utilizing grounded theory in a comparative case-study format by analyzing two villages and their associated migrant communities from the Andean District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. This research utilized a mixed-methods approach by conducting over 70 semi-structured interviews and 186 household surveys. Results indicated that there exists a unique form of direct democracy involving indigenous political organization in the villages and associated migrant communities in the capital. Indigenous political organization is used for land management, delegation of duties, relations between the associated migrant communities and villages, and has had a direct effect on negotiations with the mining companies, even extending to suspending operations at times. Correspondingly, this research also showed

that mining operations have had a substantial effect on the customary political organizations, community, and local economy by undermining the ability of villages and migrant communities to effectively work together as before. This primary finding suggests that there is a strong connection (politically, economically, socially and culturally) between the associated migrant communities in Lima and their villages, and there is a need for the villages to extend the geographic scale of negotiation for new mining operations to the surrounding villages and their associated migrant communities in order to avoid disagreements, which can be a detriment to all stakeholders involved. Additionally, as the Peruvian government has shown limited interest in regulating international mining companies, it is crucial to develop negotiation processes in the future that include the associated migrant communities, the villages, and their forms of indigenous political organization to make the decision-making process more transparent, open, democratic, beneficial, and acceptable to all stakeholders. This would not only strengthen the government's capacity for proper regulation, it would also reinforce the importance of indigenous political organization and the sustainable communal land management enjoyed by these communities for so many centuries.

Dedication

To my Mother Lucila Oscco Suarez

This study is dedicated to my Mother, Lucila Oscco Suarez, who passed away in 1997 while I was still a little girl. Her beautiful soul was always with me during my difficult struggles to achieve my education. Thank you Mama for all of your blessings, I am only sorrowful I will not have the chance to have given you a better life.

Tupananchiskama Mama.

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Fernando, Hugo, Angel, Eder, Franklin, and Wilder Miraya Oscco

Thank you for your trust in me and for always encouraging me to do my best. I hope to use my opportunity of education to benefit our family so we may achieve a better standard of life and more opportunities.

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Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Appendices

Introduction

This research focuses on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes and their forms of political organization that extend from the villages (*pueblos*) to migrant communities in the capital (*locales*) and dramatically affect local and national environmental politics. Political organization in indigenous Quechua villages of the Andes is a historic practice that exists to this day. This type of organization has governed everything from law and order, to land, water, and other natural resource rights. Now, as mining operations are expanding throughout the Andes, it is important to understand whether and how these forms of political organization aid communities in negotiating terms with mining companies. In addition, as many members of indigenous villages have migrated to the capital Lima in the past three to four decades, these urban migrants play important roles in modern indigenous political organization through their participation in both national and local politics (Peattle, 1990). These strong political ties between rural villages and urban migrant communities are important, because at this time mining companies supported by the state are seeking access to communally held lands in the Andes. How communities are organized politically will determine their ability to define the terms of mining company access to their lands.

The purpose of this research was to understand what challenges and opportunities indigenous communities face in order to organize politically, and specifically, what forms of organization can, in the long term, support their self-determination and autonomy. This research is a comparative case study of the political organizing experiences in two

mountain communities, including their migrant members living in the Peruvian capital Lima. The connection between urban and rural areas in the political organization of these communities was a highly important part of the analysis for my research because some villages are more connected with urban areas than others. I suspected this has some influence on the extent of their political influence in mining politics regionally, and I wanted to perform this case study comparison to see to what degree this is true. To this end my research questions were as follows:

1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano?
2. Does indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional mining agreements and control processes of development in their communities?
3. How does mining affect political organization?
4. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect community response to mining?

Chapter 1 begins by reviewing the literature on indigenous studies and debate surrounding indigenous identity, customary indigenous political organization as it relates to Quechua communities, common land management and tenure systems and their relationship with migrant communities in the context of neoliberal economic policies. Chapter 2 provides a brief background history of the Andes since colonial times focusing on Quechua land tenure systems, and how the political organization of the indigenous people and the struggles and resistance against the Spanish influenced indigenous land management. Then, I geographically locate the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano and

the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba where this study took place. Finally, there is a brief history and explanation of mining in Peru as it relates to the villages of this study.

In Chapter 3, I discuss the methods used to explore my research questions. I applied a mixed method pattern of data collection including 70 interviews and 186 surveys, which I performed in the villages and in Lima in 2017. Questions focused on the current mining industry, political organization, and indigenous identity. Chapter 4 covers the quantitative and qualitative results of my data collection and analysis by focusing on both thematic coding to analyze my interviews and a combination of SPSS and Google Sheets Statistics to correlate my surveys with my interview data. In Chapter 5, I present my results and discuss them with reference to the literature review. Finally, Chapter 6 details the limitations I encountered in the execution of this study, ideas and suggestions for future research, and a conclusion. I hope this research will identify existing strategies and provide new strategies of successful political organization that can help these indigenous communities have an equal place at the negotiating table.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

This literature review focuses on customary indigenous organization among the Quechua and the challenges they face in the modern era of resource extraction. The main themes discussed are indigenous studies, customary indigenous political organization, and neoliberalism's effects on mining operations. These three themes provide a framework to explain in detail how they relate to this study including indigenous identity, politicization of indigeneity, informal and formal organization, local autonomy, moral economy, migrant communities, communal land management, and specific effects of the former president of Peru, Alberto Fujimori's economic policies. This review provides the basis for my analysis of villages, their urban allies and networks that create the web of power relations in these indigenous communities. In order to understand the political organization of the indigenous people practiced through millennia in the current context, it is important to acknowledge how the sense of community has been reproduced in urban areas and how this relationship affects the decision-making process in the villages.

Much of the research concerning the Quechua focuses on their geographical indigenous identity, social movements, and the effects of globalization and neoliberalism on their traditional livelihoods (Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006; Contreras, 1987; Greene, 2006, De la Cadena, 2010, Laats, 2000; Bury, 2005, Arce, 2008, Lucero, 2009). In recent decades there has been a renewed interest in these remote areas, especially with a focus by anthropologists, sociologists, archaeologists, economists, and geographers on

traditional Andean livelihoods as they existed before, during, and after colonization (PACCPERU, 2011; Cordova, 2015; Yates, 2015). However, very little research has focused on political organization in Quechua communities and how it relates to dynamic connections between urban spaces and rural areas (PACCPERU, 2011). A review of previous indigenous studies on the Quechua people helps to establish the uniqueness of the present study.

Indigenous Studies

The field of Indigenous Studies is broad and encompasses many peoples, languages, cultures, time-periods, and modes of human living (Coates, 2003). Many authors have defined and discussed key concepts underlying indigenous studies (Holm, Pearson, and Chavis, 2003; Lee, 2006; Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Minde, 2008; Stoyanova, 2009). Here I will briefly review some of these definitions and theories and explain why I used the peoplehood model to discuss indigeneity in this research.

Definition of 'indigenous'

The definition of the term indigenous people has been a subject of major debate between scholars (Coates, 2003). Defining indigenous identity is complex and important because determining who 'counts' can affect the future political struggles of indigenous people. International organizations such as the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, etc. have defined "indigenousness" in a specific legal way with certain criteria while still allowing for indigenous peoples to self-identify as indigenous or not (United Nations, 2004). To some authors, these criteria are too narrow, because they marginalize groups that do not fit the definition exactly, denying them fundamental protections and rights as indigenous peoples (Minde, 2008; Stoyanova, 2009; Lee, 2006).

While the UN may have good intentions in their recognition of indigenous peoples and their rights of self-determination, among other rights they recognize, this

Western manner of top down legal definition can generate discomfort among indigenous people (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005). Indigenous people are still part of modern nation-states and the world economy that is confronting massive economic, social and environmental problems globally. Some indigenous studies scholars are trying to develop a new holistic framework to approach the concept of indigeneity with more inclusivity. Lee (2006) for example, described indigenous people using two definitions. First, people who faced invasion and conquest from 1492 onwards. Second, a group of indigenous people who claim to be indigenous in the modern world, but who have largely been identified through shared agricultural social structures for a majority of their history. These approaches emerging from anthropology attempt to explain the challenges of indigenous people in current systems as indigenous people are increasing their visibility.

Most researchers relate indigenous identity to their land and history, but still there are debates to find a holistic approach to determine indigenous identity. The problem with definitions that place people in different categories is that they are static. It is important to acknowledge that indigenous identities can change over time. One of the integral ways to approach indigenous identity is based on the concept of peoplehood developed by Holm, Pearson and Chavis, (2003). The authors argued that indigenous identity consisted of four factors: land, sacred history, spiritual bond and language. They expanded upon these elements to generate an explanation and foundation of "peoplehood" through a "functional matrix" model which incorporated four factors: "the language, sacred history, place territory, and ceremonial cycle" (Holm et al. 2003, p. 13).

This concept can permit us to understand and revalidate many Quechuan communities as indigenous through these criteria as they relate to South American indigeneity within the wider academic debate on indigeneity in general. This can help bring more rights and proper legal recognition to these communities as they are still largely classified by the government as peasant communities. The debate about indigenous people and how indigenous should be defined will continue in academic debates. However, as Lee (2006) stated, "...the fact remains that, politically and socially, nationally and internationally, the concept of indigenous has become a powerful tool for good. After centuries of denigration, being recognized as indigenous has become an avenue for entitlement, enfranchisement and empowerment" (Lee, 2006, p. 458).

Indigenous identity

This controversy over how indigenous should be defined is important for the identity struggle of indigenous people in Latin America. For centuries, indigenous people have struggled over the name *campesino*, "peasant", and today there are new validations of the term "indigenous" by state governments (Puente Valdivia, 2014; Yashar, 1998; Tockman, 2016).

In the Andes, indigenous identity emerged in Inca times though scholars still debate and speculate about the economic structure of Inca civilization and "…whether the Inca were socialist or feudal, a welfare state or one with 'patriarchal' slavery…" (Murra, 1961, p. 47). Furthermore, some Peruvian authors debate how the Inca state was organized before the Spanish conquest. Some of them claim the Incas used slavery but in

a different form than was used in Europe and the Orient (Lumbreras, 1989; Baudin, Woods & Goddard, 1961).

With the Spanish conquest the Inca civilization was destroyed and corrupted by the Spanish as recorded by well-known indigenous author, Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala in his 1615 manuscript on the Andean civilization, the conquest by Spanish and the abuses and exploitation of the indigenous people in colonial times. (Olson, & Casas, 2015; Guamán Poma de Ayala and Frye, 2006). Other authors have written about this time and the effects on indigenous people in the Andes (e.g. De la Vega, 1985).

Indigenous identity has been under attack in Peru since the time of the Spanish Conquest. Over time, many indigenous people migrated to the city in order to pursue economic opportunities and escape from the difficult situations that existed in the mountains such as tribute and *mita* (a colonial system that required Indians to work forced labor such as working in the mines). Once indigenous people engaged in the Spanish monetary economy, they were susceptible to changing their indigenous identity just to be accepted in society (Henderson, 2013). This process of change of indigenous people and their identity in modern times is well explained in the literature of indigenism, specifically in how indigenous writers approached their own identity at the time (Archibald, 2011; Coronado, 2014).

Indigenous identity in the Andes was heavily discriminated against during Colonial times, but now this same identity is guaranteeing new rights, “poverty alleviation and empowerment policies” in today’s modern politics (Radcliffe, 2006, p. 237). Indeed, the once demeaned, destroyed, and dejected indigenous cultures of the

Americas seem to be on a positive upswing in terms of their identities, and this seems to be having a positive effect on their political success and mobilization (Yashar, 1998).

Sociolinguistics of Quechuan Identity

It has been claimed that, "Indigenousness is an identity constructed, shaped and lived in the politicized context of contemporary colonialism" (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005, p. 597). Further, Hornberger and Mckay (2010, p. 8) in explaining Kroskrity's (2004) fifth axiom of language ideologies stated that, "Language ideologies are major determinants of social and cultural identities". Taking both of these statements, one from the field of Sociolinguistics and the other from the field of Indigenous Studies, the tremendous influence of the term "indigenous" over conceptions of society becomes clear. The term is not only constructed politically, its very use influences our languages and ultimately our discourse in society. Moreover, our identities profoundly affect the languages we speak, and the languages we speak help determine our identities. While the concept of identity has been adopted readily by some indigenous people, especially activist groups it is also, rejected by others., Thus the term identity has been a source of continual discussion, concerning indigenous politics in Peru (Yashar, 1998; Oliver-Smith, 2012; Greene, 2006; De la Cadena, 2010; Strobele-Gregor, 1996; Garcia, 2003; Varese 1996; Radcliffe & Laurie 2006; Bebbington, Bebbington, Bury, Lingan, Muñoz, and Scurrah 2008). Because of the centuries-long conflict involving the Quechua language and identity, this investigation and analysis will draw from both of these fields of research.

Politicization of indigeneity

There seem to be to two major arguments over the term "indigenous" in current literature. One says that this term is being reconstructed in a positive light that is uniting many underprivileged people under a common banner and history, this in turn helps their political organization and motivation. As Radcliffe and Laurie (2006) explained concerning the connection between modern-day development and identity in the Andes,

> "Andean development with identity provides a regionally specific example of the broad culture and development paradigm. In these new approaches, indigenous cultures once seen as an obstacle to social and economic development have become central to poverty-alleviation and empowerment policies". (Radcliffe & Laurie, 2006, p. 237).

According to this line of argument, the once demeaned indigenous cultures of the Americas have been in the process of reclaiming their identities, which has had a positive effect on their political success and mobilization. However, this has not always been the case. Other authors claim that as cultural identity was often forced on indigenous peoples, even the modern label of "indigenous" or "aboriginal" by governments has politically charged legal implications. According to Alfred and Corntassel, (2005)

> ...this identity is purely a state construction that is instrumental to the state's attempt to gradually subsume Indigenous existences into its own constitutional system and body politic...'aboriginalism' is a legal, political and cultural discourse designed to serve an agenda of silent surrender to an inherently unjust relation at the root of the colonial state itself (Alfred & Corntassel, 2005, p. 598).

The terms have been constructed and used by governments in an effort to create an exclusionary dichotomy between indigenous and non-indigenous. This, of course, has significant political implications, both for how indigenous people are perceived by non-indigenous citizens, and for how indigenous people perceive themselves.

Peasant or indigenous

Indigenous identity has been altered in different countries in Latin America by changing *indios* to "peasants" (Burt & Mauceri, 2014; Bordais, 2016; Yashar, 1998). As mentioned in chapter 2, agrarian reforms in Peru that have been taking place since the arrival of the Spanish have influenced the identities of the indigenous inhabitants of these areas dramatically. Particularly since the reforms of the Velasco government in 1967, as Yashar (1998) explained, "...these reforms obliged Indians to define themselves as peasants, particularly if they hoped to gain access to state resources. Official political discourse promoted assimilation into mestizo culture and extended resources to rural citizens insofar as they identified and organized as peasants" (Yashar, 1998, p. 33).

When Velasco's land reforms came, many *indios* became *campesinos* under the law in order to receive certain economic and political benefits from the State such as land ownership and voting rights (Yashar, 1998). Thus, this change of identity was directly linked to political opportunity and social mobility. Interestingly, this identity change has now almost been reversed, especially by indigenous leaders who are attempting to reclaim an identity that was self-detrimental for so long, and turn it into something that provides more rights, protection, and opportunities (Canessa, 2006). As communities continue to organize themselves around legal terminology that serves their best interest, language and identity are continuing to play a major role in Quechua political organization. This is evidenced by the many communities that still organize in the indigenous language allowing them the recognition of their identity.

Customary Indigenous Political Organization

Informal and formal organizations

The social structure of Quechua communities in Peru has a large impact on their forms of political organization and eventual social movements. As mentioned previously, the social structure of these communities includes the family, the village (*pueblo*), and the *local* (the community of village migrants that live in the capital). These structures constitute what Pejovich (1999) calls "informal institutions", which are different from state-approved "formal institutions" like municipalities and government agencies.
The distinction between informal and formal political organization in rural communities is important. As Pejovich (1999) states, "Some communities are dominated by informal rules. We call them "traditional" communities" (Pejovich, 1999, p. 172). Furthermore, Helmke and Levitsky (2004), give a great working definition for both formal and informal institutions. They see, "...informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels. By contrast, formal institutions are rules and procedures that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official" (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727).

These definitions are further elaborated on by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) who divide the various informal institutions into four categories based on how much their desired outcomes align with the formal institutions that exist in that community. Using these four categories it is possible to distinguish the different types of political

organization in each community. The four categories of informal political organization are shown below in Figure 5.

As is visible, the institutions are separated into those that are “divergent” and those that are ”convergent” where the latter is more aligned with government interests and the former is more against government interests. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) further separate these informal institutions into those that are operating under an “effective” or “ineffective” government as this will affect how the informal institution operates. Thus, a “competing” informal institution would be operating in a climate of little government effectiveness and a divergence of political thought between the local people and the government. This could be seen as a protest, resistance, or even revolutionary movement or organization. An “accommodating” informal institution would be one that is being forced to capitulate their autonomy to a different but effective government. The community still has differing views from the government though they now must find a way to work with the government to preserve their own interests. A “substitutive” informal institution is one that is aligned with the government interests though they are operating under an ineffective government, thus they often act as substitutes for the government by providing basic services or organization. Finally, there are “complementary” informal institutions that operate under an effective government and share the government's plan of direction, this means they help the government advance their goals within the local community.

Table 1: Helmke and Levitsky (2004)

Outcomes	**Effective formal institutions**	**Ineffective formal institutions**
Convergent	Complementary	Substitutive
Divergent	Accommodating	Competing

These definitions help relate to my term of political organization in those two communities, *pueblos* and *locales*, as different types of informal organizations according to how they are able, or unable, to empower communities in relation to their response to outside economic actors (e.g. Nonprofit organizations, mining industry, state regulations, etc.). Pejovich (1999) developed a theory called the interaction thesis, which states that as economic opportunities enter new areas, the acceptance of those activities by the informal and formal institutions in society affects the ability of that industry to develop and survive (Pejovich, 1999, p. 171). This theory will help provide a framework to test the economic viability of the different forms of political organization that exist in these two communities.

Francis Cleaver (2001) developed these arguments further with an idea he called "bricolage"[1]. Cleaver suggested that instead of having rigid denominations of groups such as those suggested by Pejovich (1999) it would be better to see these categories as holistic, multi-faceted, and interchangeably working together. Cleaver (2001) argued that many communities, especially indigenous peasant communities due to their unique

[1] "Bricolage consists of the adaptive processes in which people inscribe configurations of rules, traditions, norms and relationships with meaning and authority. In so doing they modify old arrangements and invent new ones but innovations are always linked authoritatively to acceptable ways of doing things" (De Koning and Cleaver, 2012, p. 4)

context, often exhibit multiple aspects of these classical political descriptions. Cleaver specifically stated that, "...this is (a) false dichotomy and that local resource-use practices and management arrangements are likely to be a complex blend of formal and informal, traditional and modern" (Cleaver, 2001, p. 29). This makes the idea of bricolage an excellent complement to those of Pejovich (1999).

Furthermore, Ostrom (1990; 2008) in analyzing common pool resource (CPR) management specifically focused on institutional analysis of the context of resource management as communities responded to their environment based on their own institutions and rules. She claimed that these unique rules created by successfully managed CPRs work in some places, but not necessary in other places (Ostrom, 2008). The idea of peoplehood (Holmes et al., 2003) discussed above helps to bring into focus the value of these different roles and institutions for the indigenous communities that are the focus of this research. This study attempted to address this complex network of institutions.

Local autonomy and self-determination

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People considers indigenous people as autonomous nations with self-determination. Article 4 states that, "Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self- determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in the matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions." (United Nations, 2007, p. 4).

The degree of local autonomy that a region receives is determined by many factors and can have various outcomes, both positive and negative. Some of the negative aspects of local autonomy can be local abuses or corruption that cannot be controlled by the central government. It can also include the local ambitions that some community members may have, causing deep-seated competition and rivalry among families. Moreover, increased local autonomy can cause friction between the national and local governments, which may slow development of infrastructure, education, police, and other state institutions (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). However, local autonomy is also a vital concern for many of these communities as they have organized their own forms of local governments for many centuries.

Forms of local autonomy include democratic elections of local authorities, communal decisions, and a shared understanding/expectation that all community members have a responsibility to serve the community without any salary (Mainwaring, & Shugart, 1997). The administration and development of local autonomy historically has had a huge impact on communities, because it allowed everyone to participate and serve the communities based in their own territory. As Laats (2000) explains, “With respect to self-government, it seems that the peasants form a micro political unit that corresponds with the will of the majority of their inhabitants” (Laats, 2000, p. 11). In this sense, the inhabitants of these communities organize themselves to defend and advance their own interests making local autonomy a crucial aspect of their political bargaining power. One aspect of the local autonomy exercised by these communities is the political,

economic, and sociocultural connection that is maintained with the migrants from each village that go to work or study in another city, mainly Lima.

Migrant Communities

The various organizations of migrants in Lima (*Asociacion de Comunidades Migrantes*) come from all provinces of Peru and play an important role in creating cultural spaces in the urban areas of the city. They provide a much needed recreational outlet in addition to their function as a political organization which aims at being an intermediary between the migrants and the often complicated institutional bureaucracy (Golte, & Adams, 1987). As Wagner and Fernandez-Gimenez (2008) added that, "...social capital increases the likelihood that a collaborative effort will succeed (Wagner & Fernandez-Gimenez, 2008, p. 325). Thus, the collaboration between individuals and families in the rural villages of Peru may indeed have a large effect on the social capital they bring with them to Lima as migrant communities.

Urban migration in Peru started in the 1940s and increased in the 1980s due to the terrorist movement of the Shining Path. This decade saw a rise in the migration from rural areas to the city where mostly indigenous people migrated and were exposed to discrimination and abuse. In many cases this helped cause the loss of their ethnic identity (Heredia, 2016; Starn, 1992; Burt & Mauceri, 2014). Migrant communities coming from rural areas to the city face many challenges in adapting to the capital (Kirk, 1991; Starn, 1992). As individuals, migrants from the Andes are extremely marginalized. The adaptation process also presented new challenges and problems for the migrants, such as

lack of basic services, poverty, marginalization, racism, etc. (Solari & Jorge, 2008). Migrant communities, for example, usually arrived on the periphery of Lima and were known as "invaders". This word refers to the *invasion,* or land claimed for settlement by many individuals at once. (Peattle, 1990) describes for example, "A group of between 80 and 100 families [that] decided to organize a land invasion. They had already organized an invasion two years previously, but eventually they had been removed by the police" (Peattle, 1990, p.21).

With such extreme poverty and discrimination, many migrants have difficulty finding jobs that pay a decent wage. Many migrant women are pressured to work as housekeepers facing extreme racism, discrimination, and even slavery-like conditions working in houses without much pay, while migrant men are often exploited on construction job sites, as cart-carriers, janitors, and other types of manual laborers (La Prensa, 2015). These occupations, especially housekeeping, only permit one day of rest per week, on Sunday.

Thus, Sunday is an important day for these communities as everyone comes from all their jobs and other locations in the city to the locale to have meetings, eat food, enjoy cultural activities, and sports events. Sunday is a day where many of these individuals finally feel empowered. After being in a state of marginalization all week, in the *locales* they can speak with friends in their own dialects, feel like an equal, make political decisions about their communities and villages, and participate in meaningful cultural activities helping maintain a connection with their origins. According to Agnew, Shelley, & Pringle, (2003)"…there are three elements of place: locale, or place as setting for

social interaction; location, or place located in geographical space; and sense of place, or attachment between people and place" (Agnew, Shelley, & Pringle, 2003, p. 605-606).

This makes locations such as the *locale* very important for communities, especially ones that are as marginalized and closely-tied together as the migrant communities of Lima. Providing a space for consistent and effective political organization coupled with an area for cultural festivities, sports and more helps create a "locale" with enormous political and economic potential based primarily on "social capital".

Communal-based Land Management

Communal land management consists of communities governing, managing, and utilizing their lands based on agreed communal need. It exists and has existed for many dozens of centuries. In order to discuss the ideas surrounding communal-based land management it is necessary to define a few concepts that are used often in this field of study so I can establish how it will relate to the framework of this thesis. "'Enclosure' refers to the process of commodifying new aspects of human life in a way that catalyzes broader transformation in communities and social relations. Historically, the term referred to the privatization of common village lands" (De Angelis, 2004 as cited in Grandia, 2012, p. 4). According to Grandia (2012) the first phase of 'enclosure' is usually the physical and legal takeover of land through land titling then the second phase is the ultimate cultural and social acceptance of such practices which are antithetical to village commons. Within these two phases Grandia (2012) claims that the first one is easier to

stop directly, while the second one is more subtle and difficult to detect and resist. The identification of the phase that the communities of this study find themselves in is important because it will help predict the future stages of enclosure they are likely to witness as well as provide concrete ways to resist the negative effects of such changes.

Part of the first phase that Grandia (2012) identifies includes a change in the land tenure system through a process of privatization. This privatization can take place legally, or through other means, and has the effect of removing lands that were once part of the commons, usable by all based on land management practices, and placing them in the hands of private individuals. This means that land tenure, or who inherits land and how, is a very important gauge as to whether or not land is held in common or privately.

Common pool resources and land tenure

According to Elinor Ostrom (2008), communities develop institutions to manage common pool resources (CPR). Her research indicates that successful CPR systems' institutions commonly share eight similar "design principles" (Ostrom, 2008, p. 28). These eight characteristics include: (1) defining clear group boundaries, (2) matching rules governing use of common goods to local needs and conditions, (3) ensuring that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules, (4) making sure the rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities, (5) developing a system, carried out by community members, for monitoring members' behavior, (6) using graduated sanctions for rule violators, (7) providing accessible, low-cost means for dispute resolution, and (8) building responsibility for governing the

common resource in nested tiers from the lowest level up to the entire interconnected system (Ostrom, 2008 p.28). The question of who helps create and maintain the institutions that members live by and how they are enforced is thus of major importance for CPR. For this investigation the primary characteristics that were of major importance for discussion purposes were the first seven design principles.

According to Ostrom (2008), the effectiveness and robustness of institutions is increased where extensive norms have developed over time as a collective choice. By pointing to various examples of CPR throughout the world, mostly fisheries, she dismissed the idea that people always act as selfish individuals or that all selfish decisions are inherently rational (Ostrom, 2008). Thus, even in areas such as the villages of this study, people often have the use of and responsibility for shifting plots of land while maintaining only small amounts of what would be considered "private" property in that it can be legally titled.

Loss of the moral economy, marginalization, and primitive accumulation

As neoliberalism is largely concerned with economics it is important to review the literature concerning traditional economics in Quechua communities. The concept of the "moral economy" is very important for understanding Quechua societies because it has helped govern and shape the development and function of markets as well as political organization. The moral economy concept was originally put forward by James Scott (1976) and is described by Paul Robbins (2012) as "...social systems of mutual assistance and tolerable exploitation...these systems are extended to shared land and labor as well as

to...certain forms of redistributive rent, where a proportion of their harvest is lost in sharecropping and taxation" (Robbins, 2012, p. 62). These forms of communal organization have helped create a favorable climate for political organization. Communities are accustomed to local political organization because they know each other intimately, work together on a regular basis, and largely administer their villages on their own. This has been a tremendous benefit for modern communities that are confronting issues of marginalization, "primitive accumulation", and the environmental conflicts related to mining operations.

The processes of primitive accumulation and marginalization results in a loss of moral economy, a critical component of traditional rural societies. Jim Glassman (2006) tells us that, "Primitive accumulation is for Marx, first and foremost, the 'historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of productions', transforming, 'the social means of subsistence and of production into capital and immediate producers into wage laborers' (Glassman, 2006, p. 610). According to Glassman (2006), primitive accumulation can occur in many ways including "forcible usurpation of common property", "enclosures of the commons", and "proletarianization". All of these forces are at work in the communities directly and indirectly affected by mining operations, including the Quechua community. Above all, processes of primitive accumulation not only "divorce the producer from the means of production" as Marx says, but also serve to divorce the producer from the *morals* of production. Indeed, without risk of being too romantic, this loss of morals, and the beginning of the "race to the bottom" is starting to

be noticed on a global scale as people become more conscious of corporate and governmental abuses against poor and marginalized people.

According to Robbins (2012), marginalization can occur in a society when "Otherwise environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to overexploitation of natural resources on which they depend as a response to state development intervention and/or increasing integration in regional and global markets" (Robbins 2012, p. 21). This marginalization is directly connected to a change in economic modes of production and a change of the economic mentality of a people.

The economic and social changes that come because of these changes often create environmental conflicts, or as Robbins explains:

> ...increasing scarcities produced through resource enclosure or appropriation by state authorities, private firms, or social elites accelerate conflict between groups (gender, class, or ethnicity). Similarly, environmental problems become "politicized" when local groups (gender, class, or ethnicity) secure control of collective resources at the expense of others by leveraging management interventions by development authorities, state agents, or private firms (Robbins, 2012, p. 200).

This description encompasses many of the economic processes that have been at work in Quechua communities since the arrival of the mining industry in Peru in Spanish colonial times. In the district of this study, Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), issues of marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict all combine to make this region a candidate for a study on the effects of neoliberalism on indigenous political organization, especially that surrounding the development of the mining industry.

Economic neoliberalism and mining

Another major debate that has been taking place across many relevant disciplines (e.g. political science, ecology, environmentalism, business, geography), is the discussion of neoliberalism and its potential effects on mining ventures (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 2009; Holden & Jacobson, 2007). First, a distinction should be made here between "globalization" and "neoliberalism", as the two terms are often used interchangeably. For the purpose of this study, globalization is the process of a global movement of people, ideas, products, information, and money with many cultural, economic, social, political, and historical factors (Haarstad & Floysand, 2007). Neoliberalism is an economic and political ideology that is concerned with deregulating market controls worldwide and decreasing the amount of government welfare support for social services[2] (Jessop, 2002). As Haarstad and Floysand (2007) explicitly state, we should not risk

> ...making the assumption that globalization is in itself corporate control and equating globalization with neoliberal economic ideology, and falling into a binary polemic over the desirability or destructiveness of globalization. We argue that the view of globalization as inherently empowering multinational

[2] As a new economic project oriented to new conditions, neoliberalism calls for: the liberalization and deregulation of economic transactions, not only within national borders but also—and more importantly—across these borders; the privatization of state-owned enterprises and state-provided services; the use of market proxies in the residual public sector; and the treatment of public welfare spending as a cost of international production, rather than as a source of domestic demand. As a political project, it seeks to roll back "normal" (or routine) forms of state intervention associated with the mixed economy and the Keynesian welfare national state (or analogous forms of intervention in the developmental state or socialist plan state) as well as the "exceptional" (or crisis-induced) forms of intervention aimed at managing, displacing, or deferring crises in and/or of accumulation regimes and their modes of regulation in Atlantic Fordism, East Asia, and elsewhere (Jessop, 2002, p. 454).

> corporations ignores the more complex restructuring of social, political, and economic processes (Haarstad a& Floysand, 2007, p. 290)

Indeed, Haarstad and Floysand (2007) argue that the forces of globalization (i.e. the spread of new ideas, technology, trade, and culture worldwide) could potentially be highly beneficial for social movements, political organization, and even local autonomy. This is in contrast to those who see globalization as a process of centralization of power. This ongoing debate is interesting and this case study of villages and migrant communities in the Andes should provide more information about the effects of neoliberalism on mining operations.

Since the 1990's, mining operations worldwide have largely benefited from the expansion of neoliberal policies (Jessop, 2002; Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 2009; Budds & Hinojosa, 2012). These policies have allowed for more ready access to lands across the world, many of which are lands of low-income peasants, often held communally, who have few options to resist when a large mining corporation, government agencies, and social workers arrive in these areas to convince them to permit the development of the mine (Jessop, 2002). This has caused different forms of acceptance and resistance to mining throughout the world (Bebbington et al. 2008; Jessop, 2002).

Neoliberalism's effects on mining under Fujimori in the Peruvian Andes

The problems associated with the neoliberal expansion of Fujimori during the 1990's have been well documented and discussed (Bury, 2005; Arce, 2008; Lucero, 2009; Williams, 2012); however, it is important to detail a few of these issues. The

neoliberal economic politics of the Fujimori regime permitted the entrance of the mining industry into the Andes using the discourse that the mining industry would bring development to these poor regions of Peru. However, as a result of many of these reforms, called *Fujishock* or "shock therapy" by Fujimori's government, the poorest people of Peru often suffered worst (Bury, 2005). As Bury explains, "The results of Fujimori's reforms have been significant. The Peruvian economy is now dominated by the private sector, regulated by market forces, and intricately linked to the global economy" (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Consequently, there have been increases in economic activity, foreign investment, and international exports. However, Bury maintains that many of the poorest in Peru have benefitted very little. "Overall, despite some advances in economic growth and increasingly positive assessments of macroeconomic growth rates in the country, poverty rates have either declined very little or have actually increased during the past decade" (Bury, 2005, p. 223). Aside from this, many of the approaches used by mining companies in these regions have caused division and social conflict in the communities where they operate. As a result, international economic pressure has had a strong impact on the changes to the economic system in Peru by allowing the entrance of international corporations with new regulations since the 1990's in order to promote more investment. Furthermore, the environment and traditional livelihood of peasant indigenous communities have been jeopardized throughout the Andes due to these changes, which have included the lack of control of the laws and operational normativity by the centralized government and have often created vulnerability in these communities (Arellano, 2008; Arce et al., 2009).

A study by Zoe Williams (2012) into the prevalence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) tactics by mining companies in Peru revealed that CSR campaigns are often used to obtain initial approval of the mining operations by the community. Williams (2012) discovered that the more organized a community was, the better they were able to make demands on the mining company regarding their CSR. This organization is important because during moments of contention between the mine and the communities in this study, Williams (2012) found that, "…CSR was used to defuse conflict without adequately addressing its underlying causes… [And] has functioned to buy off communities (or community leadership)" (Williams, 2012, p. 87-88). This is a concern that this study attempted to address by highlighting and examining the community conflicts that have arisen in the villages and *locales* of this study since the entrance of the mining companies.

There are many examples of the effects of mining throughout Peru, but specifically the Province of Apurimac has the highest percentage of this investment (33%) and is simultaneously one of the country's poorest regions (Sosa, Boelens & Zwarteveen, 2017). One well-known case in Tambogrande demonstrates not only some common themes found in most mining areas throughout Peru, but it also provides this research with a critical question to answer about political organization and the "...geographical scale for the voting process" that should be instituted in communities before mining is accepted (Muradian, et al. 2003, p. 775).

In Tambogrande, Peru the Canadian mining company Manhattan Minerals Corp. encountered a very big problem with their operation and investment in the year 2001.

Due to large public opposition (85%) to the mine because of a lack of consultation and consensus-building, a large local protest movement had reached its climax with a group of people vandalizing some mining equipment. One of the protest leaders, Godo Fredo Garcı´a Baca, was assassinated not long after by unknown gunmen in return. Eventually the Peruvian government and various other NGOs, like CONACAMI (National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining), and Oxfam got involved in the conflict to try and form a resolution (Muradian, Martinez-Alier & Correa., 2003). Muradian et al. (2003) make the case that in order to avoid these types of conflicts in the future mining companies must consult with local communities in a participatory fashion.

Consulting in a participatory fashion includes open discussion in community assemblies and allowing a public referendum on the issue of mining by the people whose land and livelihoods will be affected. The question that Muradian et al. (2003) then pose for future research is: what should the geographical scale of the voting process be? In this thesis, I have tried to address some of the issues around the participation of migrant communities and surrounding villages in the consultation and referendum process of the mining companies in JEM. This debate over the benefits versus the negative consequences of neoliberalizing economies, mining opportunities, and a globalized culture will continue for the foreseeable future. The profound implications and role of globalization and neoliberalism in the Quechua political organization are important for understanding their effect on mining politics and on the livelihoods of the people in these communities.

As this literature review indicates, information is lacking about the relationship between migrant communities and their home communities, how they are politically organized and how they have responded to outside influences seeking to extract resources. This research illuminates the relationship between two mountain communities and their urban migrant counterparts and their differential responses to overtures from mining companies. It addresses the following research questions:

1. How are Quechua indigenous communities organized politically, specifically in the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano, Apurimac?
2. How does mining affect political organization?
3. How does political organizing between villages and migrant communities affect community response to mining?
4. Does customary indigenous organizing help communities to negotiate regional mining agreements and control processes of development in their communities?

Chapter 2: Background and Context

The Andes in South America is the longest continental mountain range in the world. This has caused great geographical challenges for both the Incan Empire which expanded to the modern countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina and for all subsequent societies. This study focuses on communities that live in the mountains of the province of Apurimac, which means *"where the gods speak"* in the Quechua language. It is located on the eastern slope of the Cordillera de los Andes with the highest altitude of 3,952 m (12,966 ft). The ancient society in this area was adapted to this physical environment and they created innovative economic, political, and social connections between the jungle, the coast and the mountains of Peru.

Andean History

Colonial times

In colonial times, though these communities maintained some of their own local political organization, they suffered many forms of colonial oppression including “forced labor” in the mines (Frye, 2006, p. viii). In these areas there are still places where mining has existed since the Spanish ruled, where indigenous people were exploited and never received any payment, such as the silver mine at Potosi (Frye, 2006). There is also evidence of various forms of abuse and discrimination against indigenous people such as forced labor, unjust punishment, cruel treatments, exploitation, and racism (Poma de

Ayala, 1988). These types of discrimination were strongly embedded in the society of this time and many prejudices have continued until today due to this factor.

According to Laats, (2000) who did a prolonged study of the communal lands of Cusco, there is a long history of policies under which indigenous people had limited participation in decisions made about the autonomy of their own lands. This discrimination can be explained through different stages of the history of land management in Peru. In the colonial period, the process of "reduction" of the Indians was introduced where small towns were created in order to facilitate the work of evangelization. In this process the Spanish conferred the land to communities with two ways of exploitation: collective and individual, in order to collect taxes for the *corona* (Spanish crown). By the 19th century, Peru gained independence under Simon Bolivar who tried to eliminate many of the forms of colonialism in existence at that time by changing the system of communal land to private land, expecting that that would bring progress. This opportunity was taken advantage of by the elite classes of huge landowners because they were in a better financial position to benefit from the privatization of land (Laats, 2000). This would eventually cause its own problems of land management that Velasco's government would attempted to reform in the 20th century, explained in more detail below.

The history of agrarian reform.

After the Constitution of 1920, the Peruvian state recognized the existence of indigenous communities into the national legal order and in 1933 the separate legal existence of the indigenous communities expired. In 1969, President Velasco initiated the agrarian reform and landowners become agrarian cooperatives and peasant communities, ignoring the social and cultural aspects of the communities, which were indigenous. The Constitution of 1979, the General Law on Peasant Communities 24656 and the Law of Demarcation and Titling of Communal Territory 24657 among others, regulated the legality, function, rights, and obligations of the communities (Laats, 2000).

Eventually the term *indio*, created in colonial times, would be replaced with *campesino* (peasant) to align with the political structure of the Velasco government and his Agrarian Reform Program. According to Lourdes Bordais (2016), "The Agrarian Reform represents the first step towards a more just society in terms of equal opportunities and material security for those that demand it" (Bordais, 2016, p. 143). Before this reform, indigenous people were largely dependent servants working on regimens of *latifundios*, or large agricultural estates under Spanish landowners. On these *latifundios* indigenous people were still known, and degraded, as *indios*. When Velasco's land reforms came, many *indios* became *campesinos* under the law in order to receive certain economic and political benefits from the state such as land ownership and voting rights (Yashar, 1998). Thus, this change of identity was directly linked to political opportunity and social mobility, and its effects can be felt until this day.

While these reforms were passed under Velasco's government, the real work of implementation was done by the government of Belaunde during the early 1980's. In 1982 the government expanded the agrarian reform and made the process more effective and attainable for average peasants (Laats, 2000). Finally, in 1993 a new constitution defined some of these lands as privately held (e.g. urban centers, house plots, nearby family fields) and some of these lands as communally held (e.g. road/waterways, communal agricultural land, pastoral land). This has encouraged some people from some communities to sell their land (Laats, 2000). Peru still maintains communal land. In today's context the titling of communal land is not complete and there are still some communities without official land titles (SICCAM, 2016; CEPES IBC, 2016).

History of the political organization in Juan Espinoza Medrano

The district of Juan Espinoza Medrano is one of the seven districts of the Province of Antabamba located in the department of Apurimac. According to the National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI) (2007), the population of this district is approximately 1,975 inhabitants. This district contains six towns (Santiago, Santa Rosa, Calcauso, Vito, Silco and Mollebamba). Recently, there have been some conflicts between these towns since mining companies began working in Mollebamba.

In the 1980s the terrorist group the Shining Path (*sendero luminoso*) created a large war and chaos in many parts of rural Peru. The Shining Path was a communist movement that started in the Andes with the objective of taking political power. To this end, they used the indigenous people of the mountains and jungles as allies to enforce

their own political visions on the subject population. At the same time, the Peruvian military, which was sent to fight and kill the terrorists, also treated these same populations with abusive contempt when they arrived in towns that had been taken over by the Shining Path (Burt, 2006). There are many stories of abuses on both sides of this conflict that have had strong effect on the indigenous people's way of thinking, many of them now have little trust for revolutionary movements or strong governments (Méndez, & Chipoco, 1988).

The Shining Path was strongly against any kind of organization that was working with the formal political structure of the government during this time, which diminished much of the local political organization. At the same time there was extensive out-migration towards the cities in search of better options. According to my surveys and interviews, the weakening of the customary indigenous political organization during the 1980's and 1990's was partly due to the Shining Path insurgency. In these times they did not have a village president as this was not permitted, instead they had representatives called delegates (*delegados*) that worked as a type of authority for almost one year at a time. Many people left their villages in order to survive, and many authorities left the villages as well because nobody wanted to assume power due to the fear that the Shining Path might kill them.

Migrant people from different regions that were affected by this socio-political conflict arrived in the cities and started new lives on the periphery of Peru's cities, though mainly in the capital Lima. Here they lived in the most basic of conditions and they created new livelihoods.

> Unlike refugees who flee across borders, Peru's internally displaced people ...go uncounted and unrecognized, unwanted reminders of a war most Peruvians would like to forget... many of them Quechua-speaking peasants suddenly forced to abandon their small farms to confront the racism, loneliness, and economic desperation of life in an urban shantytown (Kirk, 1991, p. 5).

Later, they would establish associations, commercial conglomerates, organizations, clubs, etc. reproducing their communities throughout the city. Their experiences are detailed below.

Geo-location of this Research

The populations for the basis of this study all come originally from the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano (JEM), which is located in the province of Antabamba, Apurímac at an elevation of 10872.7ft. JEM was officially recognized as a District with its capital of Mollebamba in 1942 with the towns of Calcauso, Silco and Vito within its limits[3]. Recently, in 2009 the community of Santa Rosa also joined the District of JEM (PACC PERU, 2011).

[3] Latitude (lat): 14.0505 ° 45 ' 23.94179"S

Longitude (lon): 73.0877 ° 0 ' 49.56057"W

Figure 1: Map of Peru, (Herminia. H, 2013)



Figure 2- District of Juan Espinoza Medrano in the State of Apurimac (PACC PERU, 2011)

Calcauso (*Ccalccauso* in Quechua, pronounced Khalkhauso)

According to public registers, the community of 'Calcauso' is located in the district of JEM province of Antabamba, Apurímac at an elevation of 12122.7ft,[4] and was officially recognized by Supreme Resolution on the 6 of April 1953. Its area consists of the central township and surrounding lands amounting to a total of 934.30mi² (Archival Document from Calcauso, 1987).

[4] Latitude (lat): 14 ° 27 '0"S

Longitude (lon): 72°55'0"W

Figure 3 – Calcauso (Adrian Ccarapa, 2017)

Mollebamba (Mollepata in native language)

Mollebamba is the capital of the district of JEM, province of Antabamba, region of Apurimac located in the south of Peru located at 10498.69 feet above sea-level and encompassing an area of 433.82mi².[5] The community of Mollebamba was first recognized in 1940 and obtained legal status on the 14 of November 1956 under their

[5] Latitude (lat): 14°25'17"S

Longitude (lon): 72°54'43"W

first mayor Florentino Suarez Rea and was registered in the Property Register of Peasant Communities (Cordova, 2015).

Figure 4 – Mollebamba (Photo of Mollebamba from Mapito.net circa 2012)

Andean Geography

According to the late Peruvian geographer Javier Pulgar Vidal (1981), Peru can be divided into seven natural regions, as seen in Figure 5, based on their altitude and climate. The District of JEM is located in the region of *Quechua,* while the migrant population of this study are located in the capital and therefore live in the *Chala* region of Peru.



Figure 5 - Eight Regions of Peru (Vidal, 1981).

This diverse geography has played an important role for remote communities as it has enabled them to develop their own forms of autonomous political organization. Throughout history, the geography encouraged these remote communities to make strong connections both locally and with other regions of Peru in order to barter for regional products and crops (Contreras, 1987). Traveling merchants have conducted this regional trade since Inca times and were known as *arrieros* or muleteers. The *arrieros* not only traded goods, they were essential in the sharing of ideas. They brought news, new ideas, and inventions from other regions. Although these muleteers were largely indigenous during colonial times and before, according to Jesus Contreras, "...the muleteers played just as key of a role in politics" (Contreras, 1987, p. 50). As many muleteers were entrusted with important cargo loads and documents, they often had some knowledge of laws, finance, as well as contracts, and could thus help inform and direct their communities so they could achieve benefits or due rights from the State. The economy in

this area was based on barter and exchange products through the *arrieros* who have aided and enabled much of these communities' ability to successfully organize politically.

These different geographical regions of Peru were known as *Tahuantinsuyo* during the times of the Inca Empires, which means in Quechua 'division in four regions', thus this type of geographical division has a long history in Peru. In the Inca times, a tribe emerged called the *Chancas*, an ethnic group from Apurimac, which along with the *Huancas* from Junin, formed the principal enemy of the Inca empire before the Spanish arrived. In the time of the invasion of the Spanish, this ethnic group was allied with the Spanish (D'Altroy, 1987). According to Silverman (2003):

> How the Incas arose and came to conquer and administer this extraordinarily diverse region is one of the driving questions of Andean archaeology… in Inca myth, at least, the story begins with the Inca's surprise victory over an invading Chanca army, their mortal enemies at the dawn of the empire. The historicity and nature of Chanca society is a topic of major importance (p. 720).

The residents of the villages and *locales* that this study focuses on are descendants of the *chancas*, so understanding a little bit about their history is important for context.

Equally, the effects of the Spanish conquest of this vast Inca Empire are also important to briefly consider. According to (Belknap and Sandweiss, 2014, p. 1), because of the Spanish, *"*...conquest of the vast Inca Empire, they initiated profound changes in the culture, language, technology, economics, and demography of western South America*"*. The invasion of the Spanish dramatically affected the culture and political organization of the former Empire.

Migrant Communities

The *locales* or associations of migrant communities in Peru are well known as associations that began to appear during the second half of the 1950s and early 1960s. They formed social and cultural spaces for migrants coming from the countryside to the city (Sevillano, 2016). This type of association between space and place plays an important role in the urban areas of Peru. Specifically, Agnew's (1989) concept around "place" and "space" helps to clarify how the sense of place gives meaning to the often marginalized lives of migrants living in the urban areas through political organization and cultural activities. In this sense, migrant communities help create "reproduced communities" within these urban spaces. As an example of how the changing of place and space in a short time affected Peru's makeup Higgins (1988) as cited by Heredia (2016) stated that,

> As peasants abandoned the land and flocked to the cities, Peru was transformed in the space of a few decades from a rural country into a predominantly urban society. The main focus of migration was, of course, the capital and by the 1980s, two-thirds of Lima's population were migrants or children of migrants (Higgins, as cited in Heredia. 2016, p. 209).

Presently, the migrant communities are usually located in the periphery of the city and are tightly knit and organized into Associations of Migrants (AoM) that connect each village and their migrant members that live in Lima and other larger cities around the country. Members typically share a strong interest in their hometown and have plans of returning someday to improve it and live there or simply to visit. The political organization aspect of the *locale* normally attempts to stimulate development in their home villages. Return visits of migrants have an important impact on their villages as

migrants diffuse knowledge concerning Lima and the outside world and promote further contact between the city and village. With increasing migration, more formal steps may be taken to institutionalize aid to recently arrived migrants, previously available through kin and friendship ties, and the AoM may become a formal buffer between rural and urban life.

Adapting to the language, culture, and climate of the capital when coming from the Andes can be very challenging, especially when one is already an extremely marginalized individual in society. Many members of the communities in this research arrived in the city in this same manner and without the ability to work in professional jobs; In addition, because they lacked resources, they usually had to invade lands to have a place to sleep.

The *locales* play an important role as a cultural space in the urban areas in the city providing a much-needed recreational outlet in addition to its function as a political organization. Indeed, it could be that the marginalization so many of these migrant communities feel in their places of work only adds more to their desire to participate in the *commission* and have their political voice heard. (Sevillano, 2016). The *commission* consists of people who have been elected to manage some political and social responsibilities in the *locales*; these positions of authority change on a regular basis.

In this sense, these locales are entrenched aspects of politics and culture not only within the locales, but also extending to the villages. Many of these areas, especially in the area of Lima called Villa El Salvador (VES) where this study partly takes place, are areas of land *invasiones* (invasions) that have been continual areas of political

contestation. This political contestation has in turn created many forms of citizen organization. After many invasions and removals of people and their houses over years, VES was finally established as a "self-managing" community on the outskirts of Lima during the 1970's under the Velasco government. These and other similar areas were populated by families from the rural provinces during these decades, leaving an important impact on the development of the city. Regarding these *locales*, Peattie (1990) states that, 'local politics' and 'citizen participation' at the community level are linked to national politics, not simply as a reflection of, but also as an agency in that politics" (Peattie, 1990, p. 29).

Customary political organization

Political Organization and Social Structure

Issues of marginalization, primitive accumulation, and environmental conflict make JEM a good candidate for a study on the effects of customary political organization (CPO) on the development of the mining industry. In both villages of this study, political organization is based in *La Directiva-Comunal* (The Communal Directive), which includes the President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Speaker (PACCPERU 2011). The Communal Directive is an autonomous governing body elected by the village *asambleas* to organize the community, manage the land, and interact with the larger Peruvian government. This type of organization has governed everything from law and order, to land, water, and other natural resources rights. The social structure of Quechua communities in Peru has a large impact on their forms of political organization.

These communities include the family, the village or *pueblo* and their Communal Directive or *gobierno comunal*, the *locale* or the community of village migrants that live in the capital. In addition, there is the communal network or *red comunal,* which is an organization of various Communal Directives over a certain region which interact with the larger Peruvian government. Increasingly in modern times, as economies, technology, and politics are changing these *asambleas* are confronting issues of greater and greater political impact and significance.

The family plays an important role in politics in Quechua communities because it is the main social unit represented in the village. Each family acts as a different voice in the village meetings, called *asambleas*, to give different perspectives about the issue of the day, and each family has its own hierarchical organization. For example, the elders are more important than the young people especially with regards to their political perspectives. As an individual ages, their perspective becomes more important in the decisions that the village makes together. Usually most families hold family meetings, or *reuniones*, whenever necessary in order to discuss issues that are affecting the family or the community. These issues could include education, health, business opportunities, familial problems, local political leadership, community corruption, and most important, the discussions about *layme* (land management and distribution). In this sense, the families are the social fabric that weaves the villages and their political interests together.

This social fabric aspect of the family becomes truly evident when a local politician fails in one of their duties or is caught in some type of corruption. For example, in some communities, some families are known for being corrupt and this has an effect

for generations. Even newer generations who were not involved in any corruption will be reminded of the corruption of their ancestors throughout their lives, and especially forcefully when they begin to assume any important political charges. “Remember that your Grandfather lost this piece of land to another village because he loved a woman from there, do not follow his footsteps”, is something many young people commonly grow up hearing. In this way the actions of past and current family members reflect upon the whole family, which functions as a device of social control to make every member conscious of their actions.

The village consists of a small number of families that live together in one area and control the land and water in that territory through varied indigenous forms of political organization. The families that live in that area govern the use of land and water through *asambleas*. The *asamblea* is a democratic meeting where all the families participate to govern land and water use, construct roads, manage education, resolve territorial problems with other pueblos and many other aspects of village life. The *asamblea* also determines who will run the Communal Directive.

Communal-based Land Management

Land management can imply different types of management and development of resources depending on who is in a position of authority regarding these decisions. In communal land management people often work together, share land areas, especially those used for grazing and foot and water passage, and benefit from the land together. Additionally, community-based land management is based on a consensus decision-

making process involving all the members of the community, and this process allows for a fairly equal distribution land resources. Every member of the community helps and benefits from this arrangement and it is a very good form of customary land management. This lies in stark contrast to the capitalist and neoliberal idea of market competition and resource exploitation.

In order to accomplish this type of mostly equal distribution of resources and labor, the Quechua economic system encompasses many concepts. These include "mutual assistance" (in Quechua, *ayni*) "shared land and labor" (*minka*) and "land use and distribution", (*layme*). These are common words/practices in Quechua that have been maintained for more than 500 years, and they continue to be integral parts of these communities. Customary management in the Andes over time can be considered as a form of cultural and historical management of local resources, the most important being the control, distribution, and administration of the land and its produce. Additionally, communal management of the land for the Quechua communities in the Andes is a significant and important form of indigenous economic power. Attempts to measure "indigenous territory" have been made to see how much land indigenous people need to govern in this fashion (Davis & Wali, 1994). These forms of communal land management have given rise to new concepts around land titling and land tenure within the fields of Deep Ecology and Indigenous Land Management (Robbins, 2012).

Land tenure

These different forms of common pool resource management would be impossible without land tenure, or the ability to own, hold, and pass down property over generations. Equally, without the official titling of lands over the past decades, as detailed above, it would also be impossible to have any functioning system of land tenure in the modern legal sense. As Schwartzman and Zimmerman (2005) stated, "Although necessary, tenure security for indigenous peoples is not tantamount to sustainable management. Typically, indigenous people need to continue and develop their own socio-cultural role according their context in order to manage their own resources" (Brandon 1996 in Schwartzman & Zimmerman 2005, p. 724). For example, the distribution of land in Quechua communities, specifically in this research can be considered equitable because the socio-political structure of the communities this distribution has always maintained certain historical regulations such as, hereditary land tenure, communal dry land farming, and demarcated lands for community pasture use. Hereditary land tenure is a system of generational land ownership that is usually located close to the town that includes houses with their respective yards or small fields. If there are people who do not have land or migrate to these communities, they need the permission of the community if they want to build a house in the free areas that belong to all of the community. Furthermore, all the members of the community know which family owns each plot of land that is close to the village.

In contrast, communal dry land farming is practiced on land far away from the village and is the place where villagers plant potatoes, olluco, oca, etc. It is usually at an

elevation of 4000 meters above sea level. Usually every two years they rotate this communal dryland, which is known as *layme*, which means “a new place where you can plant” and “farmland of potato by rotation” (Paredes, 2008, p. 39).

This rotation depends on the decision of the *asamblea*, or the meeting of the population in a form of direct democracy, where by mutual agreement the population decides where the next *layme* will be. First, the members of the community decide which members will be in charge of the distribution of the land for each family. This process is rigorous especially if it is about new land that the community never used before or in the case of land obtained by conflict between other communities; in these cases, it is important to equally distribute the land use among the community members. They usually separate fields of land of about 30 acres, and they plot an equal sized field for each family. Next, each family draws numbers and these numbers correspond to different plots in the *layme*. For the next two years, each family helps to plant and harvest this land, while a special group of people known as *kamayoq* protect this land during the growing season from free-grazing animals. This is a form of ever-changing land tenure that allows for successful and equitable ownership and management of large areas of land (Yates, 2015).

Finally, demarcated lands for community pasture are free for all animals to graze. For example, the cows, horses, alpacas, etc. of the communities of this study can graze freely on any area of this land. Usually the cows can walk in the mountains and every four months you can walk to see where your cows are located.

Thus, the community organizes a rotation schedule for all of the different families' plots so that not only does everyone have a place to grow food, but they also avoid soil erosion in this manner. These examples provide concrete evidence of how these communal-based land practices benefit members of the community in labor expenditure, equal opportunity, food production, environmental protection, and more.

Mining in Peru

According to previous research about the historical accounts of JEM places in colonial times, the Spanish exploited many indigenous people in order to extract any minerals that they could, mostly gold and silver (Cordova, 2015). After independence from Spain, the people in those places continued living and developing their own economic activity largely based on subsistence farming until recent decades.

Distribution of mining rents

The economy of Latin America continues to be based on the extraction of natural resources, especially minerals, by focusing on the attraction of international investment such as the mining industry. Furthermore, countries such as Peru have become highly dependent on this type of economy, without generating their own national industry to use these raw resources and sell them for a higher price as manufactured products; instead, Peru is trapped in a type of modern-day mercantilism. Indeed, the mining industry in Peru could drive economic expansion in the nation if it were to use its resources to manufacture rather than just export, but until now this industry has been largely used for

extraction by foreign companies such as Peru Copper Inc. (Canada, China) Xstrata plc (UK, Switzerland), Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (USA), and Monterrico Metals (China). This situation has a unique relationship with social conflict that is rooted in local environmental concern (Loayza & Rigolini, 2016).

Mining activity economically benefits the nation through the use of a process called *canon minero*, which essentially taxes the extraction of resources and then redistributes that income through government assistance programs based on population. The economic benefits are allocated to regions, provinces, and districts based on their population rather than wherever the mining activity is actually in operation (Table 2). This creates conflicts over the distribution of royalties across the region (Zavalla, 2004; Jaskoski, 2014). Corruption and political interests often lead to mismanaging of the funds that are received as a part of these royalties. This intensifies social conflicts between regional politicians who at the same time need resources for their political campaigns.

This is how the corruption of money, mining, and politics is influencing social movements that are happening in the Andes of Peru.

Table 2: Canon Minero by State 1996-Silva, López, Kuramoto p.182)

States	Canon minero 96-01	% Canon minero	Population 2001	% of Population
Lima	12,397,791	81.64	6,863,363	90.10
Cañete	594,326	3.91	172,476	2.26
Huaura	563,554	3.71	182,826	2.40
Huaral	402,252	2.65	148,358	1.95
Barranca	382,741	2.52	122,201	1.60
Huarochiri	311,509	2.05	60,945	0.80
Oyon	219,990	1.45	17,903	0.24
Yauyos	218,722	1.44	27,904	0.37
Cajatambo	51,844	0.34	9,501	0.12
Canta	42,752	0.28	11,716	0.15
TOTAL	**15,185,481**	**100.00**	**7,617,193**	**100.00**

Calcauso

Since President Alberto Fujimori opened Peru to an expansion of neoliberal international investment many corporations are seeking to enter these regions and gain access to extract minerals. By 2008 they had started to explore in the region of this study. By 2010 some companies were using some new strategies of arriving in individual communities to initiate dialogue. This type of formal dialogue is well known today, and is called a *consulta previa,* or a previous consultation. This is a vital step in the negotiation process that companies are be required to perform with indigenous communities before the extraction of natural resources from their land.

Since 2010 two different mining corporations have been trying to enter the community of Calcauso. First, the Peruvian company Consorcio Minero Horizonte S.A. (CMH), arrived and offered an economic benefit to the community of $10,000 for each

100 hectares that were used as well as the creation of a social fund to the amount of $ 24,723.20 to finance some programs and projects that the community needed. In 2014, another mining company arrived in this community after Horizonte failed its negotiations. However, negotiation between these two companies during this time has finally resulted in a big project called the Corina Project. This project is located in the community of Calcauso and focuses on "... an epithermal gold deposit of mainly minerals such as gold and silver" (Minera Ares S.A.C, 2017, p.1). This project is now owned by a consortium of mining companies including the Peruvian company Minera Ares S.A.C., a subsidiary of British-owned Hochschild Mining P.L.C.

Mollebamba

In colonial times, Mollebamba attracted foreigners searching for minerals such gold and silver (Cordova, 2015). According to local oral history there were many places in the district of JEM that were exploited. Today, in Mollebamba there is the project of Trapiche. The company in this place is Buenaventura S.A.C., a Peruvian company dedicated to exploration, development, construction, and mining operations. Specifically, in this project they are mining for copper and molybdenum, as well as other minerals in smaller quantities. This project was explored in different stages from 1994 to 1998 and finally in 2000 they started the cartographic and geological work necessary for environmental impact studies on about 450 hectares. In 2006, based on the results of these studies, the company obtained permission to go ahead with mining activity in 2009. By 2010, mining activity was ongoing and this study has attempted to evaluate this

experience in Mollebamba and contrast it with that of Calcauso; these results are explained in detail in Chapter 4. Thus, mining operations in this region of the Andes have a long history, predating that of the Spanish arrival, continuing through colonial times, and expanding recently in the epoch of neoliberal international investment.

Chapter 3: Methods

My thesis research focused on Quechua indigenous communities of the Peruvian Andes and their forms of political organization extending from the villages (*pueblos*) to migrant communities in the capital (*locales*). The purpose of this research was to understand the complex political structure of these different entities and understand how they have negotiated with mining operations taking place in these communities. Specifically, two communities: Calcauso and Mollebamba were used as a comparative case study. Below, I explain the epistemology and methodology on which research is based in more detail.

Epistemology: A Pragmatic Approach to Indigenous Studies

Approaching my research with a "pragmatic" epistemology helped me to use my mixed-methods data collection processes to truly listen to, and attempt to understand, the various opinions in the communities that I studied. As the communities that this research focused on have been marginalized by society for centuries, it was critical that I respected and understood this history so as not to repeat further marginalization with my study. Most principally, I chose to study Quechua indigenous communities because I am from those communities and I consider it as my responsibility to help and advocate for them, especially because their voice is often the faintest in the national debate about mining.

Additionally, my experience with the language, culture, and local politics of these communities was invaluable as it helped my qualitative understanding and analysis of the

perspectives of the people in these two villages and permitted me trusted access to the most intimate areas of these communities' politics, sociocultural dynamics, and the direct impacts on their family lives. With the mining company affecting my village in such diverse ways, I found it necessary to unravel the diverse perspectives about these phenomena through a participatory/advocacy approach.

Consequently, I needed to constantly be aware of the "action agenda for reform" that I was pursuing in relation to my research. As John Creswell explained about advocacy research, "...inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political agenda...research should contain an action agenda for reform that may change the lives of the participants, the institutions in which individuals work or live, and the researcher's life" (Creswell, 2003, pp. 9-10). In this sense, protecting the communities in my study from unnecessary exploitation by mining corporations, beneficial education for the communities, and open conversation about their opinions on these vital issues were my primary "action" objectives with this study. Recommendations informed by this research to address their situation are presented in the Discussion Chapter of this thesis.

Approaching my studies from a "pragmatist's" stance was appropriate. A pragmatic approach gives the researcher the ability to utilize a wide array of strategies to best suit their particular inquiry. It allows the researcher to focus on the "problem" at hand more than the "method" in use; As Creswell explained, "Instead of methods being important, the problem is most important, and researchers use all approaches to understand the problem" (Creswell, 2003, p. 11). To capture as much information as possible, my research employed qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis,

and the pragmatic approach seemed best suited for this mixed-methods methodology. The use of both qualitative and quantitative data helps, "...to provide the best understanding of a research problem" (Creswell, 2003, p.12). Finally, as stated at the beginning of this section, my research includes an advocacy aspect, because of my relationship with these communities, making it highly political. As Creswell noted further, pragmatism helps apply, "...a theoretical lens that is reflexive of social justice and political aims" (Creswell 2003, p. 12). In sum, the specificity and complexity of my research question and research location coupled with its socio-political and environmental urgency were such that a pragmatic grounded-theory approach seemed the most sensible for this particular study.

Through this research I sought to help indigenous communities, particularly those suffering exploitation from mining corporations, to be included in the decision-making process of the state and market actors. Indigenous communities' missing voice is key to creating a more socially-just and environmentally-equitable and sustainable form of development. I hope this research will identify existing strategies and provide new strategies of successful political organization that can help these indigenous communities have an equal place at the negotiating table.

Methodology: A Comparative and Grounded Case Study Format

This part of my paper explains my specific case-study research methodology and some tactics applied in my investigation. According to Helen Newing , "The methodology is concerned with what you will actually do… [And] must also include an overall strategy that fits the different methods together into a coherent design" (Newing,

2010, p. 43). There were three important aspects to my methodology: (1) my comparative case study format, (2) my use of grounded theory to guide my research, and (3) my employment of mixed methods to perform my data collection and analysis.

This study compared research results from two communities about their members' feelings towards the mining industry, their political organization, and their effect on regional environmental politics. Comparing and analyzing data about social and environmental changes from these remote villages gave my research better diagnostic capability to determine differences and similarities between these communities. As Newing explained, "Comparative case study design is concerned with describing similarities and differences in different examples and discussing possible interpretations" (Newing, 2010, p. 48).

In addition, I also included in this case study each of these villages' satellite migrant communities that live in the capital, known colloquially as *locales*. The *locales* are important communities to analyze as well because of the way they can affect their villages of origin politically and economically. I know from being a member of these communities and speaking with people there, how strong the influence of these *locales* can be on the villages' political, social, economic, and environmental decisions. However, as these areas have not been studied in-depth by researchers, this knowledge is difficult to find properly documented anywhere. I found this lack of information to be another compelling reason for carrying out a case study of these communities. As Newing noted, "If the project is addressing a new, poorly developed area of research, almost any case study should add something to the current state of knowledge" (Newing,

2010, p. 47). Finally, I realized that while both of these villages and their satellite communities are very similar e.g. in race, religion, language, and culture, they are in different stages concerning the development of the mining industry and their political organization may be different. This is why I believed a case study, specifically a comparative case study, was an excellent method for my research as it enabled me to gather a large amount of information about an area that has largely not been studied.

Throughout this research I used grounded theory as a guide for my comparative case study. A grounded theory approach allows the researcher to gather information before creating a hypothesis or thesis, thus permitting a continual development of the main ideas and theories that will inform the results of the research. Grounded theory was appropriate for this research, because previous data on these areas was lacking and because I wanted to have a participatory aspect to my data collection and wait to develop my thesis completely until after I had gathered all of the data. In other words, I developed my thesis throughout my study as I collected information and listened to community members' thoughts and then, used the resources, knowledge, and ideas of the community members to guide my further data collection, analysis, and theorizing. (Creswell, 2007), explained that, "Grounded theory is a qualitative research design in which the inquirer generates a general explanation (a theory) of a process, action, or interaction shaped by the views of a large number of participants" (Creswell, 2007, p. 63). Therefore, I was attempting to not only include these communities in a participatory research design, but also to modify my narrative of these case studies as the research progressed according to the input I received from these communities.

As this case-study followed a grounded theory and mixed methods approach it was necessary to develop an organized approach to my data collection and analysis. To this end, this research used "concurrent procedure". (Creswell, 2003) explains about this procedure that, "The researcher converges quantitative and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem" (Creswell, 2003, p. 16). Therefore, I collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time from all possible sources in order to finally integrate and analyze them. This use of concurrent procedure correlated very effectively with my use of an advocacy/participatory and pragmatic approach, a grounded theory framework, and a mixed methods data collection and analysis process.

A mixed methods approach was indispensable because it allowed me to be more flexible about what type of data I could gather, both qualitative and quantitative. As this research followed a grounded theory procedure for data collection, I received direction from these two communities about my mixed methods data collection and analysis, which enabled me to follow their ideas and advice in a much more flexible and formative way. Moreover, gathering both qualitative and quantitative data encouraged me to gather as much information as possible about these communities, this was important because of the lack of previous research done on these areas of Peru. Finally, using quantitative and qualitative approaches to analyze the data gave me many complementary ways to view, revise and present my analysis. (Newing, 2010) claimed that the term *mixed-methods* refers "...specifically to research that combines quantitative and qualitative social science approaches…they can therefore complement one another in mixed-methods study"

(Newing, 2010, p. 58). In this sense, a mixed methods approach provided an appropriate way to study and compare my different case studies, follow my grounded theory, and correspondingly gather, analyze, and present my data.

Methods

I applied qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures including informal conversations, observational research, semi-structured interviews, household surveys and review of archival documents. My data analysis combined the use of extensive thematic coding of interviews and statistical analysis of household survey data to corroborate findings in both categories of data. I conducted a total of 70 interviews and 186 surveys in the villages and *locales* that addressed issues pertaining to demographics, mining, political organization, and respondents' opinions on the various changes taking place in their communities.

Participant Selection Process

Quantitative

I recruited potential participants for the household surveys using a random sample of village households in two villages. To obtain a random sample of houses in each village I used Google Maps satellite imagery of each village that I edited with Krita (Krita 3.0 2016) so that each household was selected in red and numbered in black (Figures 7 and 8). After each household was numbered in each village, I used the National Statistical Service's (2017) Sample Size Calculator to determine the total

number of people to be surveyed in the villages.[6] Once this number was determined, I used a random number generator to create a list of numbers of houses marked for a survey (Appendix D).

Once a household was selected, I visited the household and asked if they would like to participate in the survey (customary practice for approaching people in Quechua villages). Even with the random list of households to survey, a map, and my personal knowledge of the terrain, there were times when I would find no one at home in the houses pre-selected for survey. This caused a dilemma. To maintain as much randomness as possible, a coin was flipped at each house where this occurred and depending on the result, the survey was administered at either the house to its left or right.

[6] In each village I attempted to do at least 45 surveys as the total population of both communities was approximately 1,600 people and therefore the sample size needed to be at least 91 individuals in total to give me a confidence level of at least 95% with a confidence interval of at least +/- 0.1. My goal was to conduct more surveys than this if possible, but this was a minimum. In the end, I was able to conduct 142 surveys in the villages: Calcauso (85) and Mollebamba (57) giving this research an increased confidence level to 99% with the same confidence interval of +/- 0.1 (National Statistics Service Sample Size Calculator, 2017; Appendix D).



Figure 6 - Map of Calcauso with houses numbered for random sampling.



Figure 7 – Map of Mollebamba with houses numbered for random sampling.

Qualitative

I recruited potential candidates for interviews using the same randomization process described for the surveys above. I sought to carry out at least fifteen interviews in each community. I hoped to accomplish more interviews if possible, but I wanted to be sure to have a random sample of some households to begin with (Appendix C). As part of my grounded theory approach, I realized once in the village that it would also be beneficial to speak with close family members from these communities, as well as with individuals who held positions of authority. From there, I was able to use the participants' knowledge to generate interviews with more individuals that they knew or recommended. Utilizing this strategy, I was able to not only complete my randomly-generated interviews, but also many others of importance, bringing my total interviews to 58 in the two villages and another 12 in the migrant communities for a total of 70. I could not accomplish more interviews in the migrant communities because the geographical distance between their homes in Lima was often too great for me to visit them in my limited research time frame.

Language Notes

According to Ronald Czaja and John Blair, "The reliability of data obtained through survey research rests, in large part, on the uniform administration of questions and their uniform interpretation by respondents" (Czaja & Blair, 2005, p. 63). This was one major challenge for me as I needed to administer these questionnaires in both Spanish and Quechua, which meant that an excellent translation was necessary. To

accomplish this, I used my own personal knowledge of Quechua as my native language and I also consulted with Quechua language experts in Peru.

Household Survey

The household surveys were created using Google Forms and were then translated into Spanish, and Quechua. These were then printed out into hard copies so they could be brought to these communities. To begin each survey, I arrived at the selected homes and greeted the people inside, then I would ask for the mother and father of the home. I explained to them the purpose of the survey and the consent form and requested their participation. Only two households declined to do a survey because they were very busy or were not interested. About half of my surveys were conducted in Quechua and the other half in Spanish. I recorded all of my surveys with a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio recorder to be sure I did not mistake any of their answers. I administered most surveys personally rather than having participants fill them out themselves by reading each question, answering questions if there was confusion, and marking the answer for the participant. Notably, most of the young people (18-39) were able to complete the surveys themselves without assistance while most of the women usually chose to answer the survey I had translated into Quechua. As most men speak Spanish regardless of age, they chose to have the survey administered in Spanish.

Once all of the surveys were complete on paper, the data were entered into Google Forms for further analysis. In total, there were 85 survey responses in Calcauso, 57 in Mollebamba and 44 survey responses from the *locales* To filter the information

gathered through this small-scale survey I have only chosen to highlight here information from the SPSS linear regression results that show an F value of at least 1.0 and an R squared value of single digit percentages, this should provide more confidence that my results did not arise due to a sampling error. I focused my analysis on how people said they felt about mining, village politics, migrant participation in village politics, and how these ideas correlated with demographics such as age, gender, village of origin, indigenous identity, and employment status.

Household surveys were a very important aspect of my study as they allowed me to gather a large amount of data on political, environmental, and social perspectives and then code the data using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to make inferences about the data. This allowed me to then cross-reference these results with the archival documents I copied and took photos of while in the communities, giving a good picture of the political organization and its effects on environmental politics in the region. Finally, qualitative data from interviews were coded and employed to cross-reference responses. This provided triangulation of the accumulated data.

Semi-structured interviews

The majority of interviews, 58, were completed in the villages with 12 interviews coming from the *locales*. All of the interviews were video recorded using a GoPro Hero or a Canon EO5 Rebel T3 camera and audio recorded using a Miray 8GB GMD-20 audio recorder. No one declined the audio recording, but the video recording made some participants nervous, so I only recorded videos when participants were very willing.

Actually, many of them were happy with the video because they said that future generations perhaps will remember them if one day they are able to see the video. Before beginning my pre-selected random interviews, I began with interviewing people who were close to me geographically and relationally. As a new researcher, this not only helped me to develop my interview skills more and test my recording technology, it also helped to me gain a general understanding of the current political, economic, and sociocultural context in these communities.

Usually the interviews were conducted at the participant's home, but some were also carried out in their fields while they were working, and even sometimes while we were walking in the mountains. In some cases, I adjusted the questions, because the respondents did not understand many academic words, especially when they only spoke Quechua. One big difference between semi-structured and structured interviews is that with semi-structured interviews the researcher has more liberty to change the question order, skip or add a question, as well as ensuring a maximum ability to each interviewee to speak freely for as long as they wish.

Newing (2010) suggested the use of an "interview guide" to help with the organizational structure of the interviews. Utilizing this interview guide while gauging individual context, knowledge, and emotion of my research participants, led me to ask some questions of some people that I did not ask of others, I may have even skipped or added some questions based on the responses of my interviewees. I wanted my interviewees to be able to talk freely about the specific or general questions. I hoped this would make them comfortable enough to also ask me some questions so we could freely

converse about them. Newing tells us that, “An underlying premise of qualitative interviewing is that the less you direct the conversation and the more you gain the trust of the interviewee, the more accurate the information that emerges” (Newing2010: 98). I believe that my ability to speak with these communities in many different settings, in their native language of Quechua, and my knowledge of the culture and politics of these communities helped me greatly as an inside researcher in gaining the “trust” of my interviewees. As Newing (2010), explains, “semi structured interviews are more targeted than unstructured interviews but more flexible than questionnaires” (Newing, 2010, p. 102). These semi-structured interviews were an invaluable aspect to my research, especially once I collected the household surveys and compared the answers.

Informal Interviews

In addition to semi-structured interviews, I also conducted various informal interviews, which included informal conversations with members of the community. More of my free time was spent in the village of Calcauso, because sometimes my father needed my help in his fields; these provided good moments for informal interviews. Newing states that informal interviews can be very helpful in, “...providing information related to the background and context of the study cross-checking information gathered by more structured methods” (Newing, 2010, p. 100). These informal interviews were very important because people were always busy in these villages and usually they did not have time to spend an entire hour with me. Therefore, I took advantage of opportunities to speak with different members of the communities in different contexts.

This included speaking with men and women when they were walking to their fields or caring for their animals. It also included speaking with women privately when they were cooking, or speaking with men privately during their break time from work. Finally, a great informal moment to speak with people privately and in small groups was during mealtime, these were situations where people feel more comfortable and they were more prone to say what they really think or believe without my input or questions. This made informal interviews an important aspect of my study.

Participant Observation

In addition to my interviews, I also observed as many meetings (*asambleas*) as possible in the communities of this research. Being an inside researcher, I was also permitted to film these assemblies using the recording equipment mentioned above, this is not something they have allowed others to do. During these assemblies, I also took extensive notes focused on understanding the perspectives, practices, and daily routines of the members of these communities while engaged in the political process.

General Assemblies happen twice a week in each village, but if there is some kind of emergency, an Emergency Assembly can be called to resolve the issue. In addition to these General Assemblies, each week they have at least two meetings called *sesiones*. This type of meeting includes the elected authorities from the different quadrants of the village who join to discuss local matters to decide if they can be resolved there or if they need to be reported up to the General Assembly.

Meetings are usually announced using a megaphone at 5:00 A.M. and people appear by 6:00 A.M., the meeting usually lasts until 7:00 A.M. After the meeting, everyone leaves the village for their own work. Through my observation I wanted to illuminate how people express themselves in the *asambleas*, how they interact as a community, and most importantly how they organize themselves for everything from land distribution, housing construction, and field maintenance to political action that directly affects regional environmental politics. Finally, as this is a comparative case study, I hoped to compare the different methods of political organization between the two villages that I researched. Not only is observational research a great method for comparative case studies, but according to Newing (2010), observational research also, "...aims at in-depth description and understanding rather than explanation" and when combined with comparative case studies it can, "...draw inferences and generate theories about the differences between them" (Newing, 2010, p.46). This benefited my grounded theory development process.

Document Review

The final aspect of my qualitative data gathering was a review of various official documents from these communities including community statutes, mining agreements, letters from mining companies, correspondence between migrant communities and villagers, and the archival records of the actions of previous village assemblies. In addition to this form of documentation, the meetings in these villages that are discussed

above also have officially recorded minutes, which I have documented and have attempted to include in my analysis

Extensive Strategies of Data Collection and Analysis

My research contains different type of strategies that permitted my investigation to gain a broad understanding of the communities studied here. In this sense, my epistemological choice to apply an advocacy/participatory approach and pragmatism were beneficial as they provided a framework of direction that was largely decided by the very communities that I am advocating for. Furthermore, by using grounded theory to improve and add ideas, input, and information from the community members, I was trying to ensure that these traditionally marginalized communities did not become more so during the course of this study.

Chapter 4: Results

These data results show the most prominent themes that emerged after thematically coding all interviews and using descriptive and correlative statistics on the survey data with SPSS and Google Sheets Statistics.

The most important themes to emerge during this research process centered on the economic and social challenges the villages and *locales* face as a result of increased globalization and specifically the arrival of international mining corporations in the area. In discussing these themes, I distinguished two principal categories: customary political organization (CPO) and negotiations with the mining companies. In order to understand the political structure of these communities, it is important to understand the political connections with other organizations such as migrant communities for village decision-making processes, and how they shape power relations in village politics (Table 1).

Customary Political Organization (CPO)

The political organization that exists in both the villages and *locales* is unique. Major themes emerging from the interviews in this regard include the assembly structure, the process for voting between villages and *locales*, and the general authority and tasks that this political organization is charged with executing within these communities. The surveys also revealed some interesting details about political organization in these areas. To determine which factors were most important in regard to political organization to which community members, several multi-variance tests were executed. These tested the

independent variables: *gender, age, village of origin,* and *if the participant had lived in the capital or not* against the five dependent variables: (1) *Frequency of participation in village assemblies*; (2) *Ever having had a position of authority in the village*; (3) *Belief that village authorities work for best interest of the community*; (4) *Belief that political organization positively affects negotiations with the mines*; and (5) *Belief that villagers who now live in the* locales *should participate in village politics*.

Political organization of the villages

The political organization in the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba has some similarities to the formal organization of the central government, most principally in the names and roles of the different positions of authority. According to one village leader from Calcauso:

> *The organization of the Board of Directors in the community is similar to the institutions of the state that has its President, Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer, Prosecutor, etc. Both of the communities have their own written statutes that help to organize their political structure and these statutes can be modified by the assembly when circumstances change that might demand modifications.*

Thus, these communities are organized according to written rules, however; these rules can be changed as needed. As another leader of the village of Calcauso explained, "*For example the statute of Calcauso says the term for the President is two years. but in 2008 the assembly the community decided on just a one year term; because of the mining question it is dangerous to allow a President to remain for two years*". This flexibility *years*." This flexibility allowed these communities to change certain rules of authority by

consensus of the community when circumstances changed at the beginning of the negotiation with the mining companies. The frequency of assemblies and who the authorities are in these assemblies is thus of crucial importance for these communities.

Frequency and demographics of village assemblies

In the villages it was reported by interview participants that they hold weekly or biweekly sessions where the elected representatives and those in positions of authority meet, bring concerns from their wards of the village, and report back the results of the sessions. Assemblies for both villages, where all members come and participate, were held every month. These assemblies usually lasted for a few hours on average in Calcauso and an entire day in Mollebamba. The surveys indicated that middle-aged migrants (30-65) were the primary attendees making up 71.2% of the total monthly assemblies while only accounting for approximately 46.7% of the total voting population (PACC Peru, 2010), this age group was therefore overrepresented by 52% as warranted by population. In addition, less participation in the monthly meetings was witnessed for participants between the ages of 18-29 and past the age of 65 at only 28.8%. As this population accounted for approximately 53% of the total voting population, it can be said that these age groups were underrepresented by 54% as compared with their population index. The second dependent variable test about *having had a position of authority in the village or not* showed that if the participant was male, they were more likely to have had a position of authority in the village than if they were female (Figures 17 and 18). Furthermore, these results also signified that the older an individual was the more likely they were to have held a position of authority in the village. The most significant factors

contributing to whether an individual "*ever had a position of authority in the village"* were *gender* and *age* with Pearson Correlation values of 0.325 and -0.205 respectively. In this case, I divided the age groups into those between the age of 18-39 (Figure 19), and those over the age of 40 (Figure 20), to see the differences between them.

Table 3: Position of authority in the village by Gender and Age

Demographics	Position of Authority - Yes	Position of Authority - No
Males	82.2%	17.8%
Females	50.7%	49.3%
Ages 18-39	55.3%	44.7%
Ages 40+	72.6%	27.4%

These results are some of the most reliable so far tested according to the F and Sig. values reported, they showed a very low likelihood of having been obtained through a sampling error. They also seem to be the most significant so far accounting for about 16.3% of total variance, this means that gender and age account for this percentage of possible reasons why someone would have had a position of authority or not. The positive and negative correlation values for *gender* and *age* will be examined in the Discussion chapter of this thesis.

Assembly decision-making process

It is important to understand how the community assembly decides what kind of instruments of authority can be used in order to make decisions. As one individual from Calcauso explained *"...the assembly is the maximum authority, there it is decided if we will follow what the paper says or what is proper for the population."* The assembly is

the central power of the decision-making process and its implementation allows the participation of the community in a form of direct democracy by permitting each community member to not only participate in the meetings but vote directly as well. This allows them to maintain the interest of the community at heart when solving direct problems. The assembly functions very much in the same capacity in both Mollebamba and Calcauso. As a member from the village of Mollebamba said, *"The assembly resolves and analyses the problems, the leaders utilize the assembly as an instrument and like a situation of support"*. The assembly helps community members know their opinion and voice is heard. The assembly is highly important to solve any problem of the community and that encourages greater cohesion in the community. As a member from the village of Calcauso said:

> The *assembly puts order and discipline. If it were not for the assembly and the duties of the community there would be disorder here...this is why we work well, the assembly is like a father or mother...there in the assembly we discuss everything and we air our dirty laundry, if it were not for the assembly there would be tremendous disorganization.*

Despite the importance of the process of decision-making and organization in the community, it is important to acknowledge some changes that they are facing in modern times. Due to the emergence of some critical issues surrounding the mine, authorities often need to hold more than two assemblies in the same month. While assemblies still go for an entire day in Mollebamba, the assemblies in Calcauso have had to reduce their available time for discussion, especially if the agenda is about mining, otherwise it could take too much time to reach 100% complete consensus, instead majority consensus is considered acceptable. This has led to some people losing their speaking privileges and

having disagreements among themselves as a result of the pressure from these outside economic and social forces. One interviewee from Calcauso said,

> *"The assemblies don't want to delay more hours...after two or three opinions they want to cut off the discussion...Before, the assemblies didn't stop the whole damn day! Now [they go] for just a few hours, 2 or 3 [people] put in their opinions and we're done, the decision [for mining] is already approved!...In one assembly they didn't let me speak because I kicked out the miners [who are not from the village] from the assembly...What the hell are they doing here anyway and what do they have to do in our assembly [the engineers of the mining company]!? They have no reason to be listening, they should be outside of the community, we have to have the debate among ourselves."*

Conflicts such as this were taking place and, as noted above, even with Calcauso holding more assemblies than Mollebamba, they still had less time to handle these conflicts because the mining companies did not want to see a long process of complete consensus-making in the villages because that took too much time. It is important to note here that depending on the people in charge of the assembly and their viewpoints on mining, some people, like the previous interviewee, may have been ostracized or cut off from speaking their mind altogether. This was important because she said this almost never happened before the mining company arrived in the village, so it seemed some of the rules of consensus-making had been changing since the entrance of the mining companies.

The relative confidence in village of authorities was reflected in the correlational relationship among the independent variables mentioned above for the survey question: "*Belief that village authorities work for the best interest of the community.* The results showed weak correlations mostly centered on *gender* and *village of origin*.[7] 83.9% of

[7] Pearson Correlation values that were highest for *gender* and *village of origin* with values of 0.130 and 0.091 respectively.

men and 85.7% of people from Calcauso agree or strongly agree that the authorities of their village were working for their best interest. Women's views were mixed, indicating the least trust for authorities among respondents at 68.1% (Table 2). All of this seemed to demonstrate that while the political organization in these villages is a vital and important part of everyday life, these organizations are slowly changing due to outside pressure, especially from the mining interests.

Table 4: Belief that authorities are working for the best interests of the community

Demographics	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree
Male	83.9%	8.9%
Female	68.1%	17.0%
Calcauso	85.7%	6.3%
Mollebamba	74.4%	12.8%

Connection to the migrant locales in Lima

According to my interviews and survey data each village has one migrant community in Lima called a *locale,* with whom they have had deep political, economic, and social connections. These relationships had been under strain since mining companies had begun to explore the region in 2004. This is discussed in further detail in the following two themes of this chapter; however, here it is important to at least mention that Calcauso and Mollebamba maintained different degrees of connections with their respective *locales*. These connections include rules to govern political interactions between the villages and *locales* including voting powers, agreements on the scope of

political power that each organization can exert in their own sphere of influence, economic support through loans, and traditional cultural events.

At the most basic level, the link between the villages and the *locales* is familial and this often can be a route for other viewpoints to find their way into the village assemblies. As a member from Calcauso stated, "*The migrants send us [their opinions], or if not, they come [to the village]. This is how we receive them and they explain [their opinions] to us. They come to us, because as the migrants say, 'I cannot forget my Mother or my Father'.*" This connection is maintained through constant communication, economic support, and social events. Another participant from Mollebamba said,

> "*With the migrants, of course, we have communication. They have also asked for support from what the mine has given us, so we have also given them [loans] to buy their land…but before there was a [political and social] relationship. However there came a point where we did not like the locale because they did their activities with the name of the district and they had some misguided Presidents that took away the will of the migrants. They also tried to fill their pockets as soon as they made their [social] activities instead of working honestly with others. Because of this corruption we have seen, we do not have as much communication with migrants now.*"

As another interviewee from Mollebamba also agreed that,

> "*The relationship is not good; the migrants seem to want to impose their perspectives on the community and they only arrive because of the mining ignoring important issues to members of the village like land tenure conflicts with another community over land in the Puna*."

Even with relations between villages and *locales* in such a strained condition, the vast majority of survey respondents from both Calcauso (82.1 %) and Mollebamba (75 %) agreed or strongly agreed that *migrants that live in the capital should participate in village politics*. There was a moderate correlation indicating that the younger a

respondent was, or if they were from Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that *migrants that live in the capital should participate in village politics*.[8] Table 3 shows this response divided by those over or under 40 years old, and between the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba.

Table 5: Belief that migrants should participate in village politics

Demographics	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree
Ages 18-39	69.8%	16.3%
Ages 40+	81.2%	5.9%
Calcauso	82.1%	11.5%
Mollebamba	75.0%	11.5%

Additional correlation analysis showed that people who have lived in the capital had a greater tendency to believe that political organization can positively affect negotiations with the mining companies.[9] This correlation is illustrated by the fact that almost twice the percentage of respondents (61.1%) who had lived in the city agreed or strongly agreed that political organization affected mining negotiations compared to respondents who had not lived in the city (39.3%). Conversely, 28.6% of respondents who had not lived in the city disagreed that political organization affected mining negotiations where only 12.9% of city dwellers disagreed. These differences are most likely due to different experiences by these two groups regarding the mining negotiations,

[8] This survey question showed the strongest correlations for *age* and *village of origin* with Pearson Correlation values of -0.165 and 0.146 respectively.
[9] Pearson Correlation value of 0.210 showed a weak correlation with the survey question "*Belief that political organization positively affects negotiations with the mines"* and the independent variable "*lived in the capital"*

interactions with formal political institutions, and the witnessing of corruption within their own authorities

Political organization of the *locales*

The Association of Migrants (AoM) acts as the political authority for migrants from the villages Mollebamba and Calcauso who live in Lima, as mentioned above, each village has their own migrant community in Lima. It is the equivalent of the assembly in the villages. Their association consists of the same positions of authority and quasi-direct democracy already described for the villages. These type of associations, created and governed by people who migrate to the city, are commonplace and by no means unique to the two villages described here, but rather are found for most communities of migrants that have come from the provinces outside of Lima. As Enrique Puente, an engineer from the Ministry of Mining and Energy, commented during a meeting at his office in Lima, *"All the communities of the region speak with their migrants [village migrants that live in the city], it is not unique to Calcauso."* These Associations of Migrants serve the role of organizing villagers within the city of Lima and also helping to make decisions for their respective rural villages.

Each village creates their own AoM when they arrive in the city, even if they are less than a dozen people. Among various AoMs from the same district, such as Juan Espinoza Medrano, each association will elect a President to go and speak with other Presidents from the other AoMs creating an Association of the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano (AoD). As the Associations of Migrants function in their role as intermediaries

between villagers and migrants from one village, the AoD functions as an intermediary between all the district migrants in Lima collectively by interacting on a regular basis with the Mayor of the District of Juan Espinoza Medrano. Thus, each village maintains direct political connections with their respective AoMs, these AoMs form themselves in an AoD and this allows them to maintain a direct political connection with the larger District of Juan Espinoza Medrano as a whole (Figure 9).



Figure 8: Political Relationships between Villager, Locales, and District/Village Authorities

For example, during this research the migrants of Calcauso had an assembly to organize a caravan of representatives to attend the official meeting about the mining decision in the village. As the president of the assembly said during this important organizing meeting,

> "*The agenda today is about the mine, we need to send a commission that will participate in the community, so one member from each family needs to travel or if not they have to chip in for a bus ticket for others.*"

The community of Calcauso used to be just an annex of the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano, but in recent decades its status changed and it became a *centro poblado* (incorporated town) with its own mayor and local administration. This benefitted both the district Juan Espinoza Medrano and the village. Another participant said, *"The creation of the centro poblado was with the decisive intervention of the migrants...it was the decisive part of the organization of migrants in Lima that intervened for the community [in this regard]".* An influential member of Calcauso explained the function and relationship with the President of the community as a mayor of the incorporated township.

> *We have different functions. The mayor just governs the urban center and must respect the rights of protection [of the community] or help develop the urban center and manage projects and meet with the other district and provincial mayors. [This] while the President of the community represents the whole territory, so there can be conflicting problems between communities and the President would be called [for example].*

In the community of Mollebamba the Presidential election is quite different from Calcauso because the migrants in the *locale* do not participate actively in voting for the President of the community, just in the mining negotiations or any other problem where the community needs to have coordination with the migrant communities. According to the former President of the community of Mollebamba:

> *We have two types of members of the community: the active community member, and inactive community member. The active community member is one that lives in the village and participates in the labor, assemblies, and whose vote is officially registered. An inactive community member is someone from the village that mostly does not live in the village and does not participate in the assemblies or work. In this case, an inactive community member can give their opinion in the assembly when they are here in the village, but their vote doesn't count, they can only participate and make suggestions.*

Frequency and demographics of village assemblies

During my in-depth interviews in the *locales,* I asked a series of questions about *locale* political organization and the results indicated that *locale* politics is highly influenced by the variables of age, gender, and village of origin and the generation gap is pronounced. Different generations have varying perspectives regarding mining, whether migrants living in the capital of Lima should play an active role in village politics, and carry authority inside of the village. Aside from the interview data, the survey questions yielded important results about individuals participating in these organizations. These included: (1) whether they had had a position of authority inside of the *locale,* (2) how often they participated in the meetings of the *locale,* (3) whether they believed that the authorities were working for the benefit of the village, (4) whether they believed that land titling was beneficial for the village, (5) whether they participated in the village assemblies or not, and (6) whether they believed that village migrants should have had more rights in the decision-making process for the villages than the migrants of the *locales*.

The results for the first dependent variable of the surveys indicated that the younger the respondent, the less likely they were to have had a position of authority in the *locale*.[10] When the results were divided by people over and under 40 years old it became clear that 100% of respondents over 40 years old had held a position of authority

[10] The dependent variable *have you ever had a position of authority in the political organization of the locale* strongly showed that *age* was the most important factor with a Pearson Correlation value of -0.69.

in the assembly, while only 23.1% of respondents under the age of 40 have ever had a position of authority in the assembly (Figure 50). Likewise, 68.2% of people who responded to my survey participated regularly in the *locale*. However, the younger a person was, the less likely they were to participate in the *locale* assemblies (n= 44; r = .545).[11] Only 72.7 % of respondents (n= 44) who were less than 40 years old indicated they participated in the locale in Lima, while 93.8% of respondents over 40 said they participated. These observations are important in order to elaborate on the generation gap later in the Discussion chapter of this thesis.

Assembly decision-making process

Much like its political organization, the assembly decision-making process is very similar to that of the villages. As compared with Mollebamba where only active village members can vote, the fact that the community of Calcauso used to have a strong relationship with the migrants is evident in the active participation in the decision-making process of the migrants; they are allowed to vote in elections regardless of being an active village member or not. One participant from Calcauso said, *"Always migrants from different cities vote for the President [of the village], in Arequipa, Lima, Abancay, Ica, etc."*

In the community of Calcauso the participation for the election of the President of the community was always through direct vote. The migrants had the ability to participate

[11] For the second dependent variable *how often do you participate in meetings or gatherings of migrants in the locale, age w*as the most important independent variable. It showed a Pearson Correlation value of -0.545.

in votes in order to elect the President, but this right was not legally documented. It was an informal rule that was agreed upon by the assembly. Due to the arrival of the mining companies, land titling, and formal regulation, by 2016, this type of informal agreement could not continue anymore in the community of Calcauso. A different individual from migrant community (Lima) explained:

> *All of this regulation has come since the mining companies arrived in the region. Before we always voted for the President of Calcauso from Lima and we would send an official to say who the winner in Lima was so they can add in the total amount of votes for the President of the village. [We are] always in communication [with the village] and this has always been the case since we have had our organization in Lima, but now it is totally changed. The communities need to be very formal and in Abancay the review of the signatures of the volunteers is more regulated… However, as migrants we make mistake too because we could have registered everyone so we would not have had this problem*

The formal regulation of the vote affected the relationship between migrants and villagers. As a result, migrants who live in Lima cannot vote for the President, if they are not registered as a member of the community.

As an example, the same previous interviewee explained about the votes of the migrants of the *locale* from Lima and Ica:

> *Today votes of the migrants do not count in the Presidential votes in the community in Calcauso, because when they want to confirm their candidate and validate the vote of the migrant, there is no account because of the lack of formalization and registration.*

He continued:

> *Before we always considered the migrants [in Presidential votes] the problem was to present and put their names in public registers so they can count the signatures there. In Lima there is a total of 200 signatures that are not in the legal register.*

One individual from *locales* explained that it was the lack of coordination and work in *locales,* where migrants needed to register their names with the address of their home village, even if they lived in Lima most of the year. This was in order to have the signature recognized, so there were a lot of signatures from Lima and many of them were not recognized as members of the community on paper. In other words, their vote was not valid until they had registered because they did not have the address to participate in any kind of votes in the villages. One interviewee from Calcauso talked about his own personal situation:

> *I have an address in Calcauso and I can go to vote there when I want. Even though I have lived in Lima more 20 years I changed my voting address to Calcauso [so I can vote in elections] for President or Mayor, etc., so my vote for the president of Calcauso is valid!*

The third question focused on whether respondents said they felt that *village authorities work for the benefit of the village*. In the analysis, the most important independent variable with a Pearson Correlation value of 0.578 was *village of origin*. Migrants from the village of Mollebamba were more dissatisfied with their village authorities than those of Calcauso (Figures 50 and 51). In fact, not one person agreed with this statement from Mollebamba and 70% either disagreed or strongly disagreed, whereas in Calcauso those who agreed and disagreed were equal, with the other 46.7% remaining neutral. This may have been due to the communities' recent experience of negotiating with the mining companies, a process in which Mollebamba is farther along than Calcauso, as will be elaborated on in the following section about Negotiation with Mining Companies.

The results of the fourth question, whether respondents believed that *land titling is beneficial for the community* showed that the most important independent variables were *village of origin* and *age*.[12] There was a slightly positive correlation for both of these variables, indicating that the older a respondent was, or if the respondent was from Mollebamba, they were more likely to disagree that *land titling is beneficial for the community* (Table 5). This is an interesting result considering the fact that Mollebamba had just gone through the land titling process with the State, this will be explored further below.

Table 6: Belief that land titling is beneficial for the community

Demographics	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree
18-39	43.8%	43.8%
40+	14.3%	42.9%
Calcauso	40.0%	33.4%
Mollebamba	25.0%	62.5%

Connection to the villages in JEM

The relationship between migrants of the *locales* and the villagers of the village are political, cultural and economic. A very influential member of the governing authority in Mollebamba, explained how his *locale* and village of origin are connected in these diverse ways:

> *The social center of Mollebamba was opened up economically many times to solve these problems of boundaries, especially when we had problems with Matara [territorial conflict] ... in all these processes the populated center [of*

[12] These factors showed Pearson Correlation values of 0.360 and 0.332.

> *Mollebamba] was present, this is information that it is not written, that it is not stored anywhere, to [help] break down [these issues]*.

In this way a territorial conflict actually helped the village of Mollebamba develop better relations with their migrant community, especially after having it strained so much during their mining negotiation process. In another example from the same interview the participant continued to explain how Mollebamba helped their *locale* by offering them a large sum of money to purchase land in the capital and how this gesture has engendered more trust and cooperation between these entities.

> *...the community [Mollebamba] supported us with 100,000 thousand soles [for the purchase of the land in Lima] we are infinitely grateful and hope that they continue supporting us because they also have to be aware that here in Lima are all our brothers who were born there and surely they will continue to come tomorrow [to Lima] so we need to be strengthened more in infrastructure and in organization to meet the needs of both [migrant organizations and villages]*.

The results of the fifth dependent variable about the participation by *locale migrants in village assemblies* showed that *age* was the most important independent variable. Similar to number two above, this result showed a slight negative correlation for age, with younger people less likely to participate in village assemblies.[13] Men participated in the assemblies of the locales more than women (Figure 56 and 57), while younger people (18-39) participated the least (Figures 58 and 59).

Table 7: Participation by migrants in village assemblies

Demographics	Yes	No	Sometimes
18-39	50.0%	19.2%	30.8%
40+	94.1%	5.9%	0.0%

[13] This factor showed a Pearson Correlation value of -0.41.

Demographics	Yes	No	Sometimes
Males	80.0%	8.0%	12.0%
Females	43.8%	25.0%	31.3%

This same trend seems to extend as well to whether or not these migrants have held a position of authority or not.

Finally, to determine how migrants viewed voting rights in the assemblies, participants were asked if they believed that *villagers should have more rights in the decision-making process in the village assemblies.* The results showed that *gender* and *age* were the most important factors to determine this perspective. These results show a strong correlation that by being female, or younger, the respondent is more likely to support this perspective than other migrants.[14] People under 40 (64.7%), women (81.1%), and migrants from Calcauso (66.74%) were the most likely to agree or strongly agree that villagers should have more rights than migrants living in the locales concerning decisions in the local political process of the village as seen in Table 6.

Table 8: Villagers should have more authority than migrants

Demographics	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree
Ages 18-39	64.7%	17.7%
Female	81.8%	9.1%
Migrant from Calcauso	66.7%	20.0%

[14] With Pearson correlation values of -0.578 and 0.5 and an F value over 2.0 is the opinion of *locale* migrants about whether *villagers should have more rights in the decision-making process* shows a strong correlation.

Mining Operations

Many migrants of the villages and *locales* expressed both concern about and approval of the mining operations, and the negotiations that have taken place in these communities over mining have been contentious at times. The populations' opinions varied by demographics of age, gender, and village of origin. However; overall people from both villages were more in favor of mining than against it.

Village Perspectives on Mining

The surveys (n=142) showed that a large majority of the people in the villages are in favor of mining, however they expressed some concerns about environmental and social impacts of mining, and these seemed to differ based on the various demographic factors mentioned above. For example, a higher percentage of survey respondents from Mollebamba than those from Calcauso indicated support for mining near their community. Of the 48 people who responded to both these questions in Mollebamba,50% (n=24) were in favor of mining while only 23.0% (n=11) either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that "mining is a good opportunity for the community" and the rest of the respondents were neutral 27% (n=13). Calcauso had only 31.2% (n=25) people in favor of mining while 28.7% (n=23) opposed it. Another 40% (n=33) of the respondents remained neutral on this question (Table 7).

Table 9: Comparison between Villages of Respondents' Perspectives on Mining

Village	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree	Neutral
Calcauso	31.2%	28.7%	40.0%
Mollebamba	50.0%	23.0%	27.1%

In addition, multi-variance tests of the independent variables *gender, age, village of origin,* and *whether the participant had lived in the capital or not* against the dependent variable of *if the participant believes that mining is a "good opportunity for the village"* revealed that being a woman and/or coming from Calcauso both had a weak correlation to being against the mine.[15]

Approval of Mining Operations

Not all villagers, nor Lima migrants, are in agreement however about the negative effects of the mining operations. When both communities were analyzed, more villagers (39.4%) seemed to be in favor of the mining operations than against them (25.8%), while another (34.3%) remained neutral. Those that are predominantly in favor of the mining operations cite their reasons for this position as including economic mobility, development, accessibility, and a better education for their children.

One participant from the community of Mollebamba said:

> *And so, since the year 2000, [the mine] arrived here and pleaded for us to be a part of the company: Buenaventura Mining, but it was too easy to convince us. Of course, it works well for the youth because of the jobs... [So] they accepted for the jobs and not for anything else*

[15] At Pearson Correlation values of 0.153 and -0.151 respectively, the respondent's *gender and village of origin* seemed to be the most significant factors determining this dependent variable.

Clearly the main pressure in Mollebamba to accept the mine was about economic mobility and access to labor opportunities. In fact, most members of the community of Mollebamba, stated that they approved of the arrival of the mining industry due to the jobs that it will generate and the potential economic improvement of the village. These issues seemed to outweigh the other concerns that people had about community and environment.

In Calcauso, an argument in favor of the mine was that at the time of my interviews mining had not begun yet. The company representatives said that they were just doing exploration and prospecting to understand how much, and how many types of, minerals there were in Calcauso. As one Calcauso villager explained while defending the decision of the assembly to accept this first stage of the mine:

> *Unfortunately, we are subscribed to this because there is no work. Thinking in the village, and many people from Calcauso are students in different cities, there is no work and for this reason we want to accept the Ares company [the mine]... For me there is no negative [effects of this first agreement with the mining company], we just want to know if there are minerals or not. If there are, the mining company will knock on our door and if we can coordinate with the migrants there, then we can talk about prices. In this moment we are trying to cut off the mine and we don't even know [if there are minerals or not], so we want to know.*

Most of the people in Calcauso refer to this same theme, they want to know if there are minerals or not. So many are in favor of the mining company at least entering the phase of exploration to find out more information about the minerals and their potential value.

This has created some conflicts with the migrants of the *locale* in Lima, as one Lima migrant said, *"Obviously there are minerals because otherwise they would not be [negotiating] for such a long time; besides, there is proof of their investment quantity on*

the internet". Indeed, according to the article *Rumbo Minero* (2016), the investment the interviewee mentioned was on the internet and referred to the "Projecto Corina", which is the Ares Mining company's investment of $4,150,000 in the Calcauso region including $2 million specifically for exploration. As such, one respondent from Lima said:

> *There are advantages and disadvantages with the mine. There is development for the people and there is work for our people. But now as well, we should look at the environment. Also, worse corruption could present itself and it would make the [community] organization worse. In all, I am in favor for parts of the first phase to see if we have minerals or not.*

And as another participant added to this that:

> *[As far as the mine is concerned], for my part we are already old, so we want the entrance of the mine… our age is approaching us, and the resources will remain for future generations but we don't deserve anything? Well, we got together [the elders] and we decided that the mine should enter. Maybe there will be production or maybe not, but we want to know.*

One of the main disagreements between villagers and migrants was that villagers wanted to at least do exploration and see how much mining potential there was, while migrants in Lima believed that company would not be approaching the village, if they were not already sure there were minerals to be had, and wanted to agree on payment from the mining company first. These types of disagreements have created some strain on the village and *locale* relations as one woman mentioned, "*...before there was more agreement between the members of the population on decision-making... now we are not in agreement."* These disagreements can lead to strategic manipulations by the mining companies in order to obtain the acceptance of the mine by the population.

Concerns about mining operations

Those in the villages that were against mining expressed concerns about the environment, the local moral economy, uneven economic development, the weakening of family and community socio political ties, and cultural losses. L*ocale* migrant explained her fear for the environment:

> *For me the mining operation is negative because in the first place I don't know in what condition it will be in because I see on television in other places and regions that many suffer. I have seen on television, of course not in my real life, how the animals suffer with this contaminated water, animals die, plants, even oneself, even the air becomes difficult. So, the community doesn't think about this and I am against that.*

This respondent continued, expressing her concern as a migrant in Lima for her home village and indicating the deepening political divide between village and locale, "*For this reason we, the migrants [of Lima], are opposed to the mine because we see the effect of the mine everywhere. The community of Calcauso sometimes does not use its reason, they don't think because they want money*". Another interviewee, this time a woman from Calcauso echoed these concerns about the loss of the moral economy,

> *I don't want the mine to come, it will be worse for our animals, our fields, our children...if the mine comes the people will just want money and the new generation will suffer… The authorities are fighting in the assemblies, some say that there should be a mine and others say no, but [the migrants] from Lima they don't want the mine here. If it were not for Lima there would already be a mine...here [Calcauso] they just accept and don't think about the future. Because of the money, everyone just wants rice and noodles with this program that brings food [government program], they don't eat natural food anymore and have turned into lazy people.*

One individual from Calcauso,

> *As far as the economy is concerned it's possible it will get better, but also not really if they are going to submit to exploitation, then there will be a tremendous amount of corruption in the community.*

Another common concern was that mining would not benefit the elderly and women in general as much as other groups in the community. As one woman from Mollebamba said,

> *The elderly people are complaining and the authorities don't say anything and the young people are accepting [the mine]. The elderly people and the women do not agree with [the mine] because with the mine unknown people will arrive in the village, thefts, pollution so how is [the mine] going to benefit us? They will not even give us a job.*

This same concern was echoed by another woman, "*With the mine, we women do not benefit because what job are they going to give us?"* Several women interviewed were concerned about having enough money for their children's education. Though many of these women were against the mine in principle, because of these types of economic necessities, they often still said they would want to work in the mine if they could. This was challenging for them, because the company asked for special work permits and certifications that these women from the village did not have in order to get most jobs that they could qualify for with the mine. The jobs for women in the mine are limited and normally do not extend beyond on cooking and cleaning, however ever for this there are special permits. The restrictions, lacking licenses and permits necessary to work in the mine all make this a painful of experience for these women. Not only are they excluded from the labor force of an industry they didn't really want in the first place, they are also left with little to no access to provide a better life for their children. As one woman explained,

> *Sometimes necessity forces you right? My children are studying and I need money, but now they ask for certificates to work so they don't want to accept you. For example, I wanted to help in the kitchen, but I don't have a certificate so they didn't give me the job. They told me, 'You have to have a certificate'...this can demoralize you sometimes. We are peasants and we don't have these papers. So now another cook from another location will come and it doesn't make sense.*

Some of the concerns about mining operations in the community of Calcauso also bring with them hopes for something better. Many people I interviewed contrasted the potential for positive economic and technological development with the possible negative environmental impacts to the lands of the community. As one interviewee said,

> *There are two points that make us think: on the one side many people say that mining companies bring development and the other side says they bring corruption and will leave our region completely dismantled, polluted and [it will be] a tremendous disaster*

The charts below show the responses from the villages of Calcauso and Mollebamba on a question concerning the *perceived effects of the mining operations* (Figures 25 and 26). These figures show that respondents from both villages agreed on two points: mining will bring more contamination of the environment and cause social divisions. 92.94% of Calcauso respondents and 89.47% of Mollebamba respondents said they believed that mining will bring contamination to the village while 77.65% and 48.95% of Calcauso and Mollebamba respondents respectively said they believed that mining will cause social divisions.



Figure 9 - Calcauso: What will be the effects of mining?



Figure 10 - Mollebamba: What will be the effects of mining?

Locale Perspective on Mining

The survey respondents (n=44) from the *locales* were almost evenly divided between agreement (35.5%) and disagreement (38.7%) with the mining operations, with the rest of the respondents (25.8%) remaining neutral. This is a big difference when compared with the villages where most respondents agreed that mining operations presented a good opportunity for the villages.

Divided Approval of Mining Operations

The following table demonstrates some of the conflicted views of *locale* migrants about the issue of mining. Only 17.6% of young people 18-29, 21.4% of women, and 34.8% of migrants from the village of Calcauso agreed with the statement that *mining is a good opportunity for the village.* This, while 50% people aged 30-39, 50% of men, and 37.5% of migrants from the village of Mollebamba agreed with the same statement. The biggest differences then between demographics in the *locales was* between young people and the middle aged generation and between men and women.

Table 10: Belief that the mining operation is a good opportunity

Village	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree	Neutral
Calcauso	34.8%	43.5%	21.7%
Mollebamba	37.5%	25.0%	37.5%
Male	50.0%	37.6%	12.5%
Female	21.4%	42.9%	35.7%
Ages 18-29	17.6%	47.1%	35.3%
Ages 30-39	50.0%	16.7%	33.3%

Curiously, in addition to these results, 36.8% of young people 18-29, while statistically more likely to express opposition to mining, said they would be willing to

return to their villages to work for a mining company if a decent job presented itself. The older generations 30-65 seemed more apprehensive about returning with 66.7% of respondents answering "Maybe" and only 14.3% of respondents answering in the affirmative. These divisions in the community over the mine became more apparent during the negotiation process with the mining company in Mollebamba and Calcauso.

Concerns about Mining operations

Interestingly, 50% of migrants from Mollebamba, where mining activity is already taking place, agreed or strongly agreed that mining would be negative for the environment compared to 70.8% of migrants from Calcauso.

Table 11: Belief that mining would be negative for the environment

Village	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree	Neutral
Calcauso	70.8%	29.1%	0.0%
Mollebamba	50.0%	37.5%	12.5%

71.4% of women and 73.9% of migrants from Calcauso reported that they agreed or strongly agreed that mining is causing divisions in the community, while only 56.3% of men and 37.5% migrants of Mollebamba felt the same way.

Table 12: Belief that mining is causing division in the community

Village	Agree/Strongly Agree	Disagree/Strongly Disagree	Neutral
Calcauso	73.9%	17.3%	8.7%
Mollebamba	37.5%	37.5%	25.0%
Male	56.3%	37.5%	6.3%
Female	71.4%	7.1%	21.4%

Negotiation Process

Manipulation by the mining companies

The tactics and strategies the companies used in the negotiation process caused strong discomfort for people who were not allied with the mining operations, and this caused some community divisions. People from the village noticed the strategies of the mining companies, but because they saw the need for the mining jobs they did not openly criticize the companies as they normally would have. The tactics used by the mining companies included bribery, corruption, and enticements. It was very common for mining companies to sponsor large parties and festivities in villages throughout the region. As one woman from Mollebamba explained, "*For the festivities [the] mining [company] was more pompous with their party, they had many beers [to offer] as if they are economically supporting the community.*" There were also times where the engineers from the mining company came to the village and they invited people who were there to have food and drink with them. Customarily, when someone invites others in this way, no one can refuse, especially if they need the food. Many of these poor communities were not able to offer something as small as a soda or snacks to their visitors, and if somebody gave them such things, especially in a large public display, it made that person or organization look good. The villagers who received these gifts felt that they were obligated to provide a gift in return. As one man from Calcauso explained:

> *The mining companies always weaken the village so they enter first, as you see when someone arrives they always have on their side soda and they give jobs, all of this is an influence that weakens the village. We all need to work, but do we need the contract the mining company is going to offer afterwards?*

As the woman cited above said about the first phase negotiation:

> *We were only 12 people against the mine, the whole world was [in favor] of relations [with the mine]. [Social workers] were going by night teaching people to sign this because, 'We are going to give this and that, you will have money and work' the people were saying. These [social workers] are prepared to cheat the ignorant people who do not know how to read and don't even know their rights. So, they cheated them like this: in the first little group they organized to sign it was all women from the upper neighborhood, they convinced them and they made a line to receive [gifts]...After they began to sign [the contract] they gave them barbecue, beer, and soda. This day I cried of grief...This is how they convince the people!*

Not only were food and drink used to bribe people of limited economic resources, but possibilities of employment were held out. This respondent questioned though, whether this would all be worth the potential mining contract and subsequent disruption of the community and environment it might cause in the future.

Additionally, in the assemblies it was becoming more complicated to talk about mining issues because people would identify who was in favor of mining and who was not. Unfortunately, in these villages if someone was against mining, it did not look good. As a villager from Calcauso said in the assembly "*The mining company says that 'We know who are with the mine, each one has been counted up'. What is this? This is a threat to frighten the people.*" This seemed common in the community of Calcauso, while in the community of Mollebamba people spoke more openly about mining in the assemblies because they understand better now the pros and cons through their own experience working with the mining company, and they therefore accepted other opinions. Furthermore, in the village of Calcauso where the mining company was trying

to gain access, people said they felt shy to talk in the assemblies against the mining operations, especially if they did not have support. As one woman interviewed said "*[As for] the mining company being in the assemblies...The truth, I realized, is that because of fear, nobody will say anything*." Furthermore, people did not seem convinced by some of the claims of the mining company that promised they would do restoration work and they would return the land to its natural state. Respondents said they felt that the company tried to convince people with these arguments, but there were many people who believed this was cheap talk. As one interviewee noted:

> *It is 100% [guaranteed] that it will not be exactly the same. Sure, they will try to do some planting, for example Buenaventura is planting some hay...how many times have they planted and taken it out [early] because of no return? Apparently they planted in a field which they had disturbed from its original soil...they plant with hay, but it doesn't take, not even if you till 1000 times. This first place made us think that they will leave our territory a total disaster.*

Acceptance of the Mine in Mollebamba

In the village of Mollebamba the change of traditional sociocultural values were noted by many interview participants. People have become more individualistic focusing on their own benefit more than that of the whole village and this is causing people to forget about their traditional concern for the environment. As one woman interviewed said:

> *The mine has cheated the people a lot, the community is very petty now, it has divided the people, all of this money...our nature, our mountains, will be left as a bare desert, there will not be animals like we have now. Where will the new generation go?*

Despite these concerns from the opposition voices in the village of Mollebamba during and after the negotiation process, the community was mostly in favor of mining at

the time of the negotiation, and the first phase was accepted by the assembly in a vote. In recent years, after the first phase of the mining process, people have become more aware of the situation and they have a higher level of understanding of the negative effects mining may cause to village society and the environment.

Mollebamba halts mining exploration: Conflict in Parajinos

As it turned out, in the community of Mollebamba the mining was stopped after approximately seven years because of a conflict called *Parajinos*. This conflict started when the community noticed that some members of the community who had land (*estancias)* that the community allowed them to utilize for pasturing their animals received money from the mine. In that area of the village, families had rented these village lands intended for grazing to the mine. Furthermore, the mining company bought all the animals that were occupying these lands for a very high rate, and they paid each family that had animals in this place on behalf of the community. Other community members noticed when those people who lived in the area suddenly improved their economic status. By singling out a few families on communal land, the mining company representatives were not acting in good faith to negotiate with the village as a whole. Members of the community noticed and opposed this lack of moral professionalism. As one person interviewed said:

> *One group of community members* [about 40] *and about three to five individuals* [from the mine], *created this situation to benefit themselves and forget the rest [of us]. There the problem was born, where specifically in our agreement with the company, they had to do planning, organization and relocation and they did not fulfill this. For those same villagers who have benefited from de-ranging* [moving] *their animals to other far locations [and leasing their lands to the mine], they have come to increase overgrazing in other places and that generates*

> *more division and conflict. That paradoxical problem against the rest of the community is where the conflict with the company is born. The community now is at the dialogue table and we are in favor of a harmonious solution, I think there is more confidence nowadays."*

In this sense, the conflict of *parajinos* was the main problem that created division in the village of Mollebamba, indeed the mining company's representatives were still trying to negotiate with the community during the time of this research. Unfortunately, it was proving to be very complicated to fix the problem that was created by the mining industry in this area, however it was serving as a wonderful test of the resilience of local political organization in these villages. As one woman said:

> *More than anything we want to know how much they [the mine] have given the parajinos and they don't want to tell us how much they gave...Now we have been coming to dialogue for more than four years...There will be a meeting on the first Sunday of August to see if they want to continue, we are asking for a high sum, if not they can close [the operation] to open an artisanal mine, but I don't know how we are going to achieve this, our President is a little bit weak."*

Strained relations between locales and villages

Participation of the migrant community (*locales*) for both villages during the negotiation with the mining companies was strained due to a lack of consensus-building between the villager assemblies and the migrant assemblies. However, even through this difficulty, the migrants and villagers maintained their political structure and deep connections. This can be seen in the constant communication between the two bodies and the sending of delegations from the locales to vote and participate actively in key assemblies. The Lima migrants also supported the villages in many ways through their professions for those who worked in the area or in the city or through the access to resources that they had.

The disagreements between the *locales* and villages increased when the migrant community in Lima sent a document to the Congress complaining to the Engineer from the Ministry of Mining and Energy and explaining about the disagreements over the mining process in the village. This action caused much consternation within the village, which was precisely in the middle of its negotiations. A woman close to the negotiations detailed:

> *The migrants sent two documents to Congress and the Ministry of Mining and Energy without consulting the main political body in Calcauso, and why did they do this? "We love Calcauso" so they say, but this is not the case. If they [the migrants] sent these documents because they love their village, first they should have consulted the main political body and if we accept, they can do it. Unfortunately, they just did it as they pleased. So, Calcauso told them they must come and apologize so that this does not happen again. Our children that come in the future could do the same if we don't give a penalty.*

As explained above, this type of sentiment was common among many of the villagers.

Finally, even though there was a lack of communication at times between the villages and the locales, Lima migrants felt as if it were their duty to participate in the local politics and decision-making process of the village and the villagers welcomed their help, they just did not want it to be for selfish reasons. As one man said:

> *We want the support of our migrant brothers and that they support us not only when the [mining] company comes, but also we need economic support to search for engineers to make use of the territory. The new generation does not know that we border with other [Communities] and what we want from the migrant brothers is to know our [territorial] boundaries.*

The territorial problem between different communities was one of the other most important issues for the community of Calcauso at the time of this research and they wanted the support of the migrants for that.

It is important to acknowledge that in the first negotiation with the mining company, in the community of Mollebamba, the villagers had a strong disagreement with the migrant migrants in Lima. This disagreement eventually led to the village accepting an agreement with the mining company that they later regretted. Years later they would ask the migrants for their expertise in forming a new agreement with more favorable terms. When asked about this conflict between villagers and migrants, one interviewee explained in detail,

> *We made an agreement in 2011 and it was in favor of the company, also here [there was a] mistrust on the part [of Mollebamba] [towards] the migrants of Lima, [the community of Mollebamba] did not allow their participation in the agreement that we were going to make and now we have permitted it only recently in 2014. For that reason, the communal directive was changed in that we have requested migrants of Lima, as we have professionals in each town, and as we have already recognized our error, that we need our professionals to guide us. [The migrants] came and read the 2011 agreement where they observed everything was in favor of the company, we the authorities recognize [the error]. Sometimes in the assembly the majority rules ... so [in this moment] the young people [wanted] opportunity to work and they voted in favor of the opening of the mining company, so they settled on Milloccucho [the new mine].*

This situation occurred because of an initial disagreement between villagers and migrants and this was the same thing that was happening in the community of Calcauso during the time of this research. In Calcauso the villagers had a disagreement with the migrants in Lima because the migrants had been trying to stop the mining company from accessing village lands or to at least negotiate better terms. This disagreement led to some decisions that were taken by the village assembly regarding the mine where the villagers and migrants disagreed strongly.

Despite these initial differences in Mollebamba, the negotiation seemed to have improved during the time of this research, because the village\ requested the professional participation of the migrants to help the community have a better negotiating position with the mining company.. As one community leader said:

> *So, from the moment they have observed through the professionals from Lima the [migrants] have positioned themselves very differently. It did not suit the company to have that work paralyzed. For four years now we have been in full dialogue, and now at least with professional advice. I hope we can reach an agreement because we are not so convinced of what we proposed [before] because of all the consequences that can be left to the community as regards environmental impact.*

In the case of Calcauso, where the mining company was only beginning negotiations, the migrants and villagers had strong disagreements. Migrants seemed to worry more about the environment and the cultural changes in the community. As one *locale* migrant from Calcauso said:

> *What we want are fair and equal negotiations so that there is social harmony because the mine, like any other activity, is not the problem. The problem is how the mine operates, who should benefit from the mine to not generate social problems. What we migrants search for is balance and equality in participation, the mine should also play its social responsibility like it has to make some mediated programs [in the short term] and in the long term a sustainable program for 50 to 100 years for our new generations within reason because once they extract our riches, the mine is no longer viable and it will leave our land scorched and polluted; this is the danger that is looming for our community.*

Migrants from Calcauso and Mollebamba were the most in disagreement on the question whether *'political organization is beneficial to negotiations with the mines*,' with a negative correlation for AoM participants from Mollebamba, the village where mining negotiations already had taken place (Figures 56 and 57). Therefore, it seems that as negotiations progressed, many migrants felt left out of the process and were thus not

satisfied with the current state of political organization among their communities. Indeed, mining operations have influenced much political, social, and economic change in these communities, changes that are, unfortunately, not always for the better.

Mining's Effects on CPO, Community, and Local Economy

The mining operations have made such an impact in these villages that there were noticeable effects in many aspects of the CPO, community, and local economy. Some of these changes included a weakening of the CPO relationship between the villages and *locales*, an increasing generation gap, and a loss of the traditional moral economy.

Customary Political Organization (CPO)

The effect of mining on customary political organization (CPO) and vice versa can be grouped primarily in three broad themes: the weakening of CPO ties between villages and *locales*, corruption of the authorities, and land management. Mining was also affecting the political landscape and the traditional land titling process through the encouragement of capital investment strategies by the government, which was creating a less cohesive political organization in the community that was more susceptible to individual land divisions of traditionally communally-held lands. Here, I will briefly explain each of these themes while showing evidence from the interview data in the form of participant quotes.

The weakening of customary political organizational ties.

The political organization of the indigenous people of what is today Peru has a long history that predates the Spanish colonial times and was suppressed during the colonial period as detailed previously in the Context/Background chapter. Furthermore, in the 1980's the Shining Path severely weakened the political structure in Indigenous communities. One interviewee from Mollebamba explained how the community became divided and lost trust in the authorities, and some individuals in particular who agreed to the mining operations. She stated that:

> *In different places I have heard that [villagers] will be fighting [about the mine] while the President of the community is taking money [from the mine] under the table. People have told me this in various locations and this will never see the light of day because this is hidden...also because they are safe and assured while we are fighting among ourselves, this continues until now.*

According to the surveys in the *locales*, 65.2% of all respondents see their connection to the villages as "moderate", while 16% and 37.5% of respondents from Calcauso and Mollebamba respectively felt that their relationship was "weak". Interestingly, Mollebamba, where the mine had already been developed for more than fifteen years, reported one instance of selfishness regarding the relationship between villagers and locale migrants, while 16.0% of respondents from Calcauso reported that the relationship was "strong", but the mine appeared to be changing that (Table 11).

Table 13: Perceptions of villager and migrant relations

Village	Calcauso	Mollebamba
Strong Relationship	16.0%	0.0%
Moderate Relationship	68.0%	62.5%
Weak Relationship	16.0%	37.5%

This will be touched on again in the Discussion chapter while exploring the theme of the psychological pressure of modernization. Finally, 44.4% of respondents agreed that external factors like mining were the principal causes for weakening political organization in the community. Among respondents, 15.91% said that they believed that globalization/neoliberalism (i.e. the opening-up of domestic markets for exploitation by foreign governments and companies) was the second major factor causing a weakening in the relationship between migrants and villagers (Figure 43).



Figure 11 - Weakening relationship between villages and *locales.*

Corruption of the authorities

The corruption of the authorities, and the people in general, concerned migrants of the locales and also the members of the villages. Unfortunately, the authorities were not as respected as in the past. This situation created less trust of the leaders by people in

their own assemblies. Furthermore, increasingly people began to want to serve as an authority in the village just because of the economic connection opportunities and not to benefit and further the community. This trend began in the communities with the arrival of the mining industry arrived and has only magnified since then. As one respondent from Mollebamba said, *"...they [the ancestors] worked for the love of the village and the people, not for the economy like today; now just for money people want to be President [of the community]".* Most members of the community highly agreed that the authorities were receiving some kind of economic benefit from the mining companies and this situation created disagreement and less social cohesiveness and respect for their own authorities. One member of the community of Mollebamba explained it like this:

> *So what happened with these people? With the President, Vice President, Fiscal Secretary, [the whole administration], I believe they have been receiving [payoffs] because I see them doing well economically...some of them received [payoffs], others were forced by the mining company to sign [the contract] in Abancay [the regional capital], so they will have given them [payoffs].*

A similar situation occurred in the community of Calcauso where conflicts started after the mining company arrived in the village and began trying to gain the acceptance of the community. The community decided by majority, in the assembly by a public vote, to accept the mining enterprise. In recent negotiations with the mining companies, the authorities found that some signatures had been given without the permission of the people in the community or assembly. Later the community realized that the negotiations had already been completed between the mining company and the authorities of the

community. At that point, the conflict in Calcauso against the authorities started. According to one interviewee from Calcauso:

> *Just recently what happened was that the authorities signed [the mining contract]. Why did they sign!? We think they gave [the authorities] some amount under the table. How much could they have given them? While us, who are we? …So since this moment the divisionism has arrived.*

Participants in both communities and their *locales* strongly agreed that the corruption of the authorities and members of the communities was the most negative impact since the mining industry had arrived in those communities. As a result, there was less trust of the community toward their own authorities. The primary ways that the mining companies brought corruption to village political management was through the weakening of customary political organizational ties, land management and titling disagreements, and through manipulative strategies.

People of the locales related this corruption to the corruption at the national and state levels, they feared this type of corruption was now coming to local communities. As one migrant community member explained:

> *We are in this problem that we don't want the national scale corruption of the country to be repeated [here]... so this situation has already created a culture of authorities like this and I believe the people that want to become authorities already have more of an economic vision not to serve [or guide] the people*

Conflict between locales and villages

As touched upon above, the conflict between the two villages I researched started at the beginning of the mining operations in Mollebamba. The primary concern at the moment of this investigation was that the surrounding communities' traditional land management was being affected by mining development, so villagers had started to

mobilize to not sell land to the mining company. One respondent from the community of Mollebamba explained how this began:

> *They [the mining company] told us they would give us such and such amount...there were two proposals: one to sell and one to rent what was convenient for the community. Well, many people almost wanted to accept selling, luckily the information spread to the neighboring villages. Vito, Calcauso, Silco all came as a commission to [protest], so it was accepted to just rent [the land].*

At the same time, people from the community of Calcauso complained about the decision-making process in Mollebamba which had not allowed the participation of the other communities such as Calcauso. This was especially offensive to Calcauso as it was the village primarily affected by these land developments, because the river that runs by Calcauso was expected to be the first to witness contamination. Calcauso is closer to the initial brunt of potential contaminated river exposure and thus wanted to be consulted. A member of the village of Calcauso explained the disagreement:

> *Mollebamba went ahead without consulting us, and we are the first ones affected by the [headwater] contamination, flora, fauna, plants, trout, and animals are in at risk of being polluted...they did not give us the ability to participate in the assemblies when they [Mollebamba] had a meeting with the company Buenaventura...so they just did this internally without even consulting at least with their children who are residing in Lima and other cities...Mollebamba regrets [this decision] now that the mine has finished with the exploration of about 10 years... now recently [Mollebamba] has consulted with the migrants of Lima and now they say, "The [the mine] cheated us terribly", and they have recently suspended [the company] and now they are in constant renegotiation.*

In the first round of negotiation in the community of Mollebamba, the migrants had less participation because the village disagreed with the *locale's* participation in the negotiation with the mining company. This was because most of the migrants were not allied with the mining company and it would take more time for the consensus process

between these two groups to be carried out properly. It takes time to coordinate and reach consensus between two organizations through this type of CPO, which requires a high-level of direct democratic participation to be successful. As one interviewee said, *"In reality, thanks to Calcauso, when Mollebamba signed [the contract] an organization came to make mitin [protest]"*

Land management

Land management in the villages was based on the traditional reciprocal work of *ayni*, *minka*, and *chaqma* described in the Literature Review chapter, which helped develop social relations between members of these communities. Furthermore, a very important responsibility of the village authorities was to help manage the land. The traditional work that had been practiced for millennia in these communities was changing rapidly during recent years as the amount of mining increased in these places. Because of different land use norms and patterns held by the mining companies, some villagers were concerned that the land practices that had sustained them for so long would soon be in jeopardy. As one respondent said:

> *Speaking about the community of Calcauso, we rotate the 'chaqma' (community field planting), every year we designate a new site...the land has to rest 4 to 5 years and after that we rotate it again through the community. Each community member gets two years [of use], the first year [they plant] potatoes, the second year vegetables...when we do this process of exchange between community members we call it 'comiso'. And to care for [these lands and their crops] we call 'camayoc'.*

This statement showed how intimately connected the people of the village were with the land that they cultivated. It also showed the extreme lengths they went to ensure equal

use, equal labor, and equal benefit by all members of the community of this land. The fact that the words for these practices are mostly all words from Quechua is important to note linguistically, as words or concepts that come from one culture or language often are maintained in that same language, especially if no other adequate substitute exists in the dominant language of the society (Schmitt & Marsden, 2006). This means that these land practices were most probably of indigenous origin and pre-dated the arrival of the Spanish and their language.

Furthermore, villagers expressed concern over the loss of family and community relations due to the mine entering into business in the region. As one Calcauso villager described when asked about how the mine had changed community relations due to the influence of money:

> *Before there was 'ayni' (reciprocal work-trade) between 4 to 10 people daily, now they want to be paid instead. Even the children want money. The local government program recruits people when there is work and now we don't work together in the fields, with this program you recruit people only with money [and not work-trade].*

Another respondent said about this government program:

> *The program completely corrupts the new generation especially the mothers and the people that do not dedicate themselves to agriculture. Now they are accustomed to eating junk food and there is no motivation to plant. Agriculture has failed with this program and that is why people are sick, they are not giving natural food to their children.*

Respondents indicated that this program that the government brought to local communities was making people more dependent on outside services and many people were simply waiting for jobs from this program instead working in their fields to produce their own food.

These changes in land management practices in these communities was affecting free space that they used to have. Traditional communal land management in the community of Mollebamba close to the urban area has become more private than communal land. For example, people started to build fences and separate from each other in order to title lands that for generations belonged to their family. This created conflicts between families and communities because everyone wanted to build a fence for their own plot in the village and surrounding areas. As one interviewee from Mollebamba said "*I don't even have a place to go to the bathroom freely, everything is fenced and walled in*."

Land titling disagreements

When asked whether land titling is beneficial for the community in the survey, there were two positions with the villages and *locales* largely divided. 67.7% of villagers agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that *"land titling is beneficial for the community"*, while only 34.7% of migrants agreed with the same statement. Multi-variant correlation tests yielded results that showed that *village of origin* was the most important independent variable.[16] The community had been struggling with the process of land titling arriving in these communities and it had been a very complex process that often generated more conflict between families and members of the community. A former President of the community of Calcauso, said in the assembly that

> *Titling land [individually] does not benefit our community in the long term, instead we should find a way to title the whole the village. We know there is*

[16] Being a villager from Calcauso shows a weak correlation with believing that *land titling is beneficial for the community* with a Pearson Correlation value of -0.217.

> *pressure by the mining companies to title the land so they can easily enter our land, because as communally-held land it is harder for them to deal with, but if everything were private it would be easy to buy those lands.*"

A woman from Calcauso manifested her concern about land titling of communal agricultural fields, "*The houses can be titled, but not the fields."*

Some people such as a man interviewed from Calcauso were in favor of land titling because it would help bring financial structure and authority to people's property holdings, this would in turn, allow them to obtain credit from the banks. He said, "*Land titling [can be] advantageous because of the financial security it brings, if you do not have a title to your property to do a loan with, not having these facilities can be negative*". Similarly, a man interviewed from Calcauso detailed the debate taking place in these communities over land titling and the advantages and disadvantages that came with that:

> "*Well I think each one has advantages and disadvantages ...we must have our goods formalized in the urban area to be able to say that this is mine, but in possession any problem can become worse, for me yes I agree, but also what is coming suddenly could be the payment of property assessment..[land titling] has also come out in an assembly for approval ...the whole majority in an assembly all said 'Yes' to [land titling in the urban area] and then COFOPRI [state property assessment agency] entered Mollebamba, then there was divisionism [among people who wanted land titling and those who did not] .. some said that 'I will not title [my land]' and there were others who wanted to...so maybe there was a misunderstanding ... [also] possibly the Mayor saw some good benefit for the population by having a title, for example, if one wanted to participate in the new roof program [from the State], for me the intention by the Mayor was to see the people orderly with their land titled*"

A man from the community of Mollebamba affirmed that land titling could be good because it gives individuals control of their own properties. He explained that,

> *COFOPRI is good because it will prioritize your right to your house, you can sell it [for example]…in the indigenous times we paid 'alcabala' because we had some land; my father paid this tax every semester or monthly, when we had harvests, depending on how much you produced, so you would produce a lot of food to pay the Velazco government [their taxes]*.

On the other hand, there were participants from all communities I researched that were also apprehensive about land titling. For example, a woman from the village of Calcauso said she believed that the community needed more investigation about this subject because it was something new for the community and some people did not understand some of the consequences of these actions. She said:

> "*Land titling will happen here and I do not know if it will be good because maybe in the future our homes and things will be seized by the State, I am thinking in the taxes we have to pay right? We need more investigation about this because if this happens, we don't have work as you see [to pay the taxes]*."

The vice president of the Community of Calcauso also acknowledged that they needed more information about this subject. He agreed that:

> "*We are not well trained about this project from COFOPRI to title lands. Two years ago [COFOPRI] entered the District [of Juan Espinoza Medrano] and one year ago they titled Mollebamba, and well this year [2017] other communities...like in the city, overtime, we will come to pay property taxes to the State."*

People from the village seemed to understand that they did not have enough money to pay taxes to the government for the land that they owned, and this was a major concern about the prospect of land titling. In addition, they were concerned about the inadequate knowledge that these State institutions operated on about how communal land functioned in their communities. As a village leader from Calcauso complained:

> *"We are not in conditions to pay the State for the communal use [of land]...here they are missing a commission, a Ministry of Agriculture sector, that can look at*

> *the problems of the communal lands, of titling, and of the urban centers. COFOPRI comes and they don't know what to say."*

Another, concern from the people in the villages was that if the land becomes private it would be difficult to organize the community and people will lose interest in the communal assemblies and duties in the community. As one woman said,

> *There are people that want to privatize here, there should be no private property because when there is private property the owner of that land does not want to hear about anything "communal"...they no longer participate in the [communal] labor and assemblies.*

This point about land titling is important because it affects the ability of mines to gain access to land, and land titling had already happened in Mollebamba and there were some disagreements because of this decision, so these results make sense *prima facie* and will be explored more below.

Community

The effect of mining on the community of the villages and *locales* and vice versa can be divided into two broad themes: how participants would like to see their villages in the future and a generation gap that was increasing. Moreover, external factors, encouraged by the entrance of the mining industry were changing village and migrant socio political relations primarily through the entrance of modern neoliberal values such us individualism, competition, monetization, and self-interested local politics.

How participants would like to see their village in the future

I asked a question in the survey concerning *how the participants would like to see their village in the future.* Figures 44 and 45 show that 62.35% of Calcauso respondents

and 73.68% of Mollebamba respondents said they wanted to see their village have a healthy environment in the future. Needless to say, with most respondents in favor of mining and simultaneously concerned about contamination of the environment, these results are curious and will be addressed in detail in the Discussion chapter of this thesis. Another curious result I will elaborate on in the Discussion chapter, is that it appears that Calcauso was keen to see more development and economic opportunities while Mollebamba was concerned about maintaining language and cultural practices into the future.



Figure 12 - Calcauso: How do you want your village to look in the future?



Figure 13 - Mollebamba: How do you want your village to look in the future?

Generation gap

As introduced above, there was evidence of a generation gap and various migrants alluded to the fact that they saw the relationship between generations getting weaker over time. This was noticeable both in terms of the generation gap and the feelings about participation in village politics by migrants of the *locale*. As one man from Mollebamba said,

> *There does not exist [political participation] for the new generation...we are [elderly and] already finished, so I don't know where the youth that are not familiar with reality will take us in the end.*

The elders were concerned about the lack of emerging leadership among the young people, because the youth seemed to not listen to advice from the elder generation and the gap was getting stronger each year. A woman from Mollebamba indicated:

> *[The new generation] they only search for land [to buy] and look towards the mine. Before one worked with stones and mounds [for fences] and now only*

> *barbed wire for everything. There is no space in any parts, everything is with barbed wire...The new generation eats different than we do [preferring sodas and sweets] to what we ate before like chuno, lawa, and saralawa thus there was more respect with the food, the grandmothers and grandfathers were very strong, now the young people don't do anything. The situation is complicated here, but it must be this way everywhere, right?*

The elders of the community did not understand why this change was happening so rapidly. The unwillingness of young people to listen to and learn from stories of the past in order to plan for the future was not a good sign for the older generation. According to one elder:

> *The new generation has over-generalized the past so that for them there is no past, only the present and the future. 'The past is already over', they say, and they don't want to know anything about the past...sometimes they just silence us...I just go to the assemblies, I look, I listen, and sometimes when they say something to me, I participate. If I participate too long [the new generation] will become bored.*

Local economy changes due to mining

There were some shifts of the traditional economy in these villages toward consumerism as many of the interviews described. The differences between Mollebamba and Calcauso were that since the mining had entered Mollebamba more than 10 years earlier, the economy had changed strongly and many people, especially men, were working in the mine and not in their own land. This meant that women had to work by themselves in the field and they could not do that well because much of the work in the field requires both men and women. It is necessary for both sexes to work because men can easily till the land with a traditional tool that has been in use since Incan times called

the *chaquitaclla,* whereas women usually play the role of planting the seeds and small plants.

As the people from Mollebamba already had had experiences with mining since the period of exploration began in the early 2000's they had faced some significant changes in the local economy of the village as compared with Calcauso, which had yet to fully experience the economic effects of the mine, but which was still feeling the social and economic pressure of these dramatic changes to their neighboring village. According to my quantitative data, Mollebamba was more concerned about the future generation at the moment than Calcauso, which was more preoccupied with mining negotiations and disagreements between villagers and migrants over the future of mining. Some of the effects of the mining that Mollebamba had seen included a shift in the price of labor and a loss of the traditional economy, while some of the effects of the mining that Calcauso had seen included increased social and economic pressure to modernize.

Due to this context with the mining, everyone was only consuming and buying food from the store. As one interviewee mentioned, "*The driver who came with the car to sell product [told me] he has noticed a strong change before and after the mining operation as people are just buying food at any price.*" It seemed the impact of new foods and work habits was strongly affecting the community of Mollebamba, which had almost completely changed their livelihood. The most affected were the elderly due to their being accustomed to traditional work habits and relations. Because work was such an integral part of the development and maintenance of social relationships in these communities, this change was especially dramatic for those members of the community

that still relied on this type of social organization. There were still people of this older generation that wanted to maintain this type of traditional local economy that was not based in money, but in work-sharing and the well-being of all members of the community.

In Calcauso, with the recent arrival of mining, they were just beginning to face this type of similar economic pressure and development. As one respondent from Calcauso said:

> "*Calcauso is trying to improve putting houses with tin roofs [instead of straw]. Unfortunately, some people are still building the roofs of their houses with straw. In Mollebamba almost all of the houses have tin roofs and are made of cement and brick [not adobe]*."

Many people that I interviewed made this same observation, that a sign of economic prosperity from the mine was the structural improvement of people's homes.

Economic disparity

Through the customary political and labor practices of these villages, major economic disparity had largely been avoided, until now. The disparity of the distribution of wealth was the most visible in the town of Mollebamba where before the mining arrived it used to be more equal. Development used to work for everyone without anyone taking advantage, but instead helping and sharing with each other. This has been noted above in regard to the lack of respect for the elders that had emerged where work-sharing was concerned. Before, when any elderly person wanted support in their land people would go there and help them without asking for money; instead, the elderly people would prepare food for the helpers, this is called *minka*, which is a traditional form of

work that is slowly disappearing. As a village elder from Mollebamba said: *"Minka was work we did for the elders, for the widows, for those people that needed help from the population."*

Unfortunately, the new generation are losing these values and the elderly are very concerned about the loss of these traditions and values that seems to be fading within the community. As a woman from Mollebamba said:

> *"When you get older then the people don't want [to help you]. I didn't put anything in the field because it is difficult [there is no one to help]. I don't know what I am going to eat, this is why I must go and work. And when I do request work collaboration they want 50 soles, from where am I going to pay this!? As elderly people [the government] gives us something and with this I have to live...some people are developing their houses and they have cars, and for us, nothing...They all already have a car, those that had their fields close to the mine, they receive the money, and for us, nothing. This is why we are arguing, because come are complaining that the mine gave some people a lot of money, and for us?"*

The elderly people were the most vulnerable to these changes because they needed young people that could help them in the traditional work such as *chaqma and minka.* Without this type of collaborative work, it was impossible for the elderly to work by themselves.

The traditional moral economy in these communities was based in the exchange of product and work that was called *trueque*. This type of exchange was well known in the Andes. This happened where people, known as *arrieros*, from the villages would travel long distances in order to exchange their products and bring them to the village. The exchange for this food was usually done with clothing or food that was not available where the *arrieros* came from. Through this type of fair trade system, locations with far

distances between them learned to exchange potatoes with salt or sugar, etc. One man recounted his memory of the *arrieros*:

> *I remember seeing my father three times bring four to five mules...and he would bring us sugar, noodles, things that did not exist because there were no merchants like now where you can buy bread. To get bread there were people that travelled and they brought us [bread and noodles] that is how we came to know about eating bread and sugar as well.*

In this region until the 1980s most of the economy was still based on *trueque*. In just a few short years the differences in the economy of this area had shifted completely. Highways and infrastructure brought a new economy based on monetary value and because now cars could bring products from the coast or jungle one just needed the money to purchase them.

Loss of the Traditional Moral Economy

While labor prices increased to around 40-50 soles ($12.37- $15.47) for a day of work due to the mine's influence, this was not positive for everyone in the community. As one village leader said, *"With agriculture there is no return anymore because they [the average worker] charge you 40-50 soles. From where are we going to get this quantity?"* In general, for most workers, it was probably good that wages were rising, however one village elder was quick to note that, "*The elderly are not going to benefit from this because they can only work at the mine until the age of 50*". Equally, as mentioned above women have been being restricted from this work due to a lack of proper certifications or licenses. This means that while the elderly and women will be excluded from the labor force, the traditional economy that they have relied on for generations has also been at risk of collapsing due to the lack of enthusiasm for

traditional forms of work trade like *ayni, minka,* and *chaqma* that have been so rapidly disappearing.

As explained above, *ayni, minka,* and *chaqma* were traditional forms of work trade that Quechua communities engaged for centuries. Most often it consisted of one person or a group of people helping out another group with certain large projects like building a home, tilling or harvesting a large field, or some other community project. These work trades might not be paid back for many seasons or years, but it was one of the elements that maintained cohesiveness in these villages; if someone owed another person work in the future, no one was going to try and destroy that relationship through selfishness, greed, or other negative actions. Thus, the loss of this traditional moral economy could engender more division in the community. As one respondent stated simply *"Ayni and minka will disappear because people just want money.*" This type of traditional work was explained in detail by and elder from (Mollebamba):

> *If we bring up the history of these systems of work [ayni and minka] it is the inheritance of our ancestors, from the Incas this system comes and it worked perfectly up until I was a teenager. For example, minka was a job for elderly people, widows, and others who needed help from the population. Ayni was a reciprocal work trade, today for me, tomorrow for you. Mita was a type of communal work like for repairing canals, roads, and unfortunately with the appearance of the mine these systems of work are disappearing...Calcauso has gone backwards abysmally. For example, the elderly and the widows, among other populations, are relatively abandoned because everything is focused on money, in productivity and production.*

Another point made by respondents was about people's attitudes and diets changing with the loss of this traditional moral economy. When asked about this, Stanis's wife responded that. *"It is not like before...with the mine they [the young people] have*

changed their attitudes and behaviors for negative ones. The children now are different, they don't eat toasted corn anymore, just food from the store." Another woman added to this point:

> *Before in your old age, the youth would help with ayni or any type of reciprocity work, they would also help without pay, but now everything is paid…'If you pay me like the mine 40 soles, then I will go to your field', that is how the new generation answers [when you ask for assistance], and all this the mine has caused to change a lot. Now, with the mine, it has corrupted and cheated the people and exploited the community members...I am always debating in the assembly because I notice why the community has had their rights cheated, sometimes because, I am elderly, they tell me, 'Why do you complain?'*

This response helps show that not only are monetary and economic factors important for the traditional moral economy, but also how the loss of this economy was affecting people's attitudes, diets, and village cohesiveness. In many ways, this observation encompassed the major themes of the changes that are taking place in these villages due to the pressures of globalization, and especially the local mining industry, including the generation gap that is forming and the loss of the traditional moral economy.

Table 14: Similarities and Differences between CPO in Calcauso and Mollebamba

Characteristics	Calcauso	Mollebamba
Land Management (Ostrom, 2008)	Communal	Communal/Private
Institution Type (Pejovich, 1999; Helmke and Levitsky 2004)	Substitutive	Substitutive
Session frequency	Twice a week	Twice a week
Duration of sessions	2 hours	2 hours
Assembly frequency	Every month	Every month
Duration of assemblies	2-3 hours	All day
Village authorities	Mostly men aged 30-60	Mostly men aged 30-60
Stage of mining negotiations	Accepted Exploration Stage in July 2017	Completed Exploration Stage in 2012, currently in negotiations about the Extraction Phase.
Voting rights	Anyone from the village or *locale*	Only active village members
Connection to *locales*	**Was strong**, but is **now becoming strained** due to differences over mining negotiations	**Was strained** due to differences over previous mining negotiations, **now is improving** due to conflict between the mine and village

Chapter 5: Discussion

In this chapter, I will explain how my research results relate to the theories and concepts presented in the Literature Review. The main ideas discussed here are indigenous peoplehood (Thomas, 1990; Holm et al., 2003), effective and ineffective formal and informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004), institutional bricolage (De Koning & Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012), Ostrom's (2008) eight principles of common pool resource management, and the geographic scale of mining negotiation participation (Muradian et al.,2003).

The complex political structure of indigenous communities throughout the Andes includes their migrant communities that have helped shape a unique form of organization. This relationship in recent decades has been disrupted due to different changes and the entrance of outsider entities such as transnational mining companies that often have not included these migrant communities' participation in negotiation processes. As a result, these communities have seen the weakening of the customary relationship between villages and migrant communities, which has created more social conflict and less cohesive political organization even as the long-term negotiation processes with the mining companies have been underway. Villages seemed to be the most affected by these negotiations. Examples of this included the division between migrants and villagers, social hierarchies, environmental destruction and loss of traditions. These situations often did not ensure wellbeing and a better standard of life for the people, instead it generated more local political degradation and dependence upon the central government to pursue

their own development. Based on my interviews, it was clear the values of the authorities had completely altered because the value of being a village authority or working to benefit the community was diminishing. Meanwhile the value of wage labor was increasing. This situation appeared to have created less trust between community members and their authorities as well as less trust between the villages and *locales*. However more studies of other villages with and without mining operations are necessary to confirm these results. Furthermore, the division and disagreement in the initial negotiation with the mining companies has created a platform that could end up giving unequal benefit to the mining corporations because of the lack of agreement and participation in the bargaining negotiation process by the migrant community and all members of the villages.

The negotiation process with mining companies takes many years. Calcauso has been involved in a long process of negotiation that had taken almost one decade since different companies arrived in the community and tried to obtain the community's consent. Obtaining the consent of the community, or the social license to operate, is where the process of negotiation with mining companies and the relationship with the community begins (Williams, 2012). This long process of negotiation can generate political deterioration between different interest groups, such as the villagers and locales, and this conflict can damage the long term unity of the political organization between these groups.

In the case of Calcauso, the migrant community used to have a strong relationship with the village and their participation in the decision making process was always assured

from the time when the migrant community began their political organization in the city. This relationship has changed due to the different aspirations and interests of people from the migrant community and the villages. Throughout my interviews, there was a pattern of migrants disagreeing more with the mining operation than villagers. However, many indicated that if the mining operation were to be allowed by the village, then they should have the best negotiation possible to benefit the community. In complex democratic organizations, the process of consensus can take longer than in less complex and less democratic political organizations due to these differences of opinion (Mainwaring, 2006).

Interviews also indicated that public opinion in the District of JEM regarded Calcauso as having a reputation as a very unified, organized, and cohesive community. People from Mollebamba recognized that Calcauso has this type of reputation in the district and in the whole county based on interviews conducted in the summer of 2017. Even so, the negotiation process that took place in 2017 led to conflict and disagreement between the village of Calcauso and their migrant community in Lima. Due to this long process and the uncertainty over what costs or benefits mining might bring, the assemblies witnessed more conflict between members of the community. Every month in the assemblies the same problem of mining was discussed, which eventually wore the community down. In addition, as explained by Williams (2012) above, the strategies of clientelism, favoritism, and bribery that corporations used to keep the leadership of the community on their side resulted in a bad perception of the leadership by members of the community. This change of perception has led to a loss of respect for the authorities, loss

of self-reliance and more dependence on external factors and institutions in regard to land management rules under the traditional economy by community members.

My findings are supported by literature suggesting that almost all Andean communities who have had migrants move to the city have strong political and social ties with their villages of origin (Wallace, 1984; Adams & Golte, 1990). These relationships depend on the geographical scale of their population, social values, family ties, and their customary political organization.

Indigenous Identity

The concept of indigenous identity is poorly understood or developed in these communities and their *locales*. Young people with higher education are more likely to have a contemporary understanding about indigenous identity. According to my qualitative data, this lack of understanding about the current concept of indigenous identity is related to language usage and the prejudice against the word "indigenous". Furthermore, many participants in my interviews preferred to identify as peasants and less as Indian, particularly because this word is associated with strong racism. It is an insult to call somebody *indio* (Altamirano-Jiménez, 2013).

Through the interviews and survey responses it became clear that the concept of indigenousness was new for most of the respondents and needed to be explained. For example, one respondent was asked in the survey if he identified with his indigenous identity, instead of answering in the affirmative or negative he asked, "*What do you mean indigenous? I heard this term before, do you think we are still indigenous?*" These types

of questions were very common throughout the interviews and surveys. Furthermore, elderly people were more likely to respond with, "*I do not know what indigenous is*". When I mentioned the term "Indian", most of them, especially the elders, rejected the term and some of them explained me in a nice way that "*Indians are in the Puna (the highest and poorest part of the Andes), most of them they do not speak Spanish, and they lived with llamas and alpacas, so I think we still have some Indian people, but not a lot".* This situation reflected what is known about the colonial mentality and the influence of the changes of identity by outsider entities such us the State with the imposition of the term *indio* and eventually *peasant*. As many authors have also discovered, this manipulation of language and terminology has created much confusion for the indigenous Quechua of the Andes today (Lobo et al., 2016). Furthermore, even though the traditions, language, and land practices are still in place, it does not matter for them if legally they are not recognized as indigenous and cannot receive their due benefits and rights.

Although this research does not attempt to focus on the profound debate about indigenous identity, it does acknowledge that these communities are indigenous based on the framework of peoplehood explained in the Literature Review Chapter. According to the theory of peoplehood, marginalized indigenous peoples can advocate for, and revalidate, the origins and ethnicity of these communities as an indigenous people due to their common history, language, cycles of ceremony, and their continued connection with, and management of, the land they still inhabit (Thomas, 1990; Varese & Chirif, 2006). This interconnected characteristic of the peoplehood theory is manifested in very consistent ways in these two communities.

In the context of resources extraction, one member of the village of Mollebamba noted about this indigenous past, "*The mining is not something new since the colonial times. Our ancestors confronted many abuses due to the extraction of minerals without any pay, as an example there are places well-known for their notorious exploitation and physical evidence exists even until today*". Furthermore, these communities have maintained their cycles of ceremonies through time and space. Although the loss of the tradition in the recent decades in the district of Juan Espinoza Medrano has increased and fewer people are practicing ceremonies to the Pachamama such as: *waka tinka*, and *llama tinka*, today most of the people celebrate the ceremonies as part of traditional festivities. However, it seemed that fewer people continued the traditional practice in their daily life. The sacred land is also related to certain places considered to be spiritual land; however, the geographical and physical boundaries of these communities is also legitimately administered by the members of these communities creating a type of mixed indigenous Andean and Western liberal model of livelihood and societal management.

It is important to acknowledge in the debate over the future maintenance of the language the incorporation of modern technologies and the education system to further the use of Quechua. If this is not done, the new generation will continue losing their interest to speak their native language especially within the *locales* of the cities where migrants often face loneliness, racism, and discrimination. Thus, it is possible that a new framework is required to define the political organization of these modern indigenous communities. As some authors (Adams & Golte, 1990; Kirk, 1991; Starn, 1992; Solari & Jorge, 2008) recognized there are many challenges to develop legal frameworks that

identify indigenous people who migrate to the city and live far away from their traditional homeland. Due to economic pressure, these ethnic groups are spatially segregated. This relationship between villages of origin and migrant communities (*locales*) deserves further research. Lobo et al. (2016) framework of 'ethnopolitical boundaries', for example, notes cases in which migrant people still maintain their connection with the villages, and in the case of not achieving success or accustoming themselves to the city life, they always have their land that will be a part of them, if they wanted to return again to their homeland.

This discussion might help with gaining recognition of migrant communities' indigenous associations. As detailed above, the organizations of migrant communities were created as informal organizations that today have become legal institutions. These organizations were capable of incorporating their culture, traditions, and community awareness through cultural spaces in urban areas, often without any legitimization by the formal institutions of the state. However, they were able to reclaim cultural significance and advocate for legal legitimization of their traditional festivities and traditional customs by migrants through their channels of informal and formal institutions in the city. These studies suggested that there be more research into how indigenous political organization functions in different spaces and contexts.

Effective and Ineffective, Formal and Informal Institutions

Throughout the Andes many communities have a direct or indirect relationship with *locales* (culturally, politically, socially, etc.). Adams and Golte (1990) discussed

how rural peasants influenced the process of configuration of the city of Lima. The institutions in both communities share similarities such as their own statutes and book of laws that needs to be approved by a sanctioned State institution. As Helmke and Levitsky (2004) explained, many communities included in this research are recognized by formal State institutions, though they operate under both written, and at times, informal and unwritten rules. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the political motivations of the State and other formally sanctioned institutions toward informal institutions such as the village assemblies and *locales* can be dangerous as they may inadvertently cause the rejection and de-legitimization of any kind of informal organizations. This dichotomization undermines the customary political organization that informal institutions often rely on. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) explained that informal institutions can shape the outcomes of formal institutions, this understanding can bring other questions such as to what degree these outcomes can be changed, and by whom? Furthermore, they mentioned that, "We need to know more about what induces state actors to formalize rather than oppose informal institutions" (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004 p. 734). I hope this study can help actors from formal institutions to understand and reach out to those from more informal institutions. Doing this would make these formal State institutions more effective and would enable the informal institutions of these communities go from being Substitutive institutions to Complementary institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004).

In this regard, Ostrom (2010) explained the mechanisms whereby communities that often rely on common–pool resources (CPR) management create more trust and

legitimization of their own organization among members. (Ostrom, 2010) named six "attributes of micrositutaions" and claimed that they are the primary ways that individuals develop trust of each other within commonly managed resources (Ostrom, 2010, p. 661). These attributes apply to all communities that practice CPR and include the need for open communication between members. These attributes include known reputations and histories of members, high marginal per capita return (MPCR), ability to enter and exit organization easily, a long-term vision by the community about the use and benefit of said resources, and a system of rules and penalties. These attributes can help to bridge the gap of communication that has traditionally existed between indigenous communities and the State, which often lacks understanding of both the local political structure and its function in the communities where mining is arriving. By focusing on developing these attributes, the State could help to build a bridge between formal and informal institutions that could create more cooperation between institutions. Improving the relationship between the informal and formal institutions means both recognizing and increasing the rights of CPR management by the local communities, including control over their mineral resources while improving the effectiveness of formal institutions in their communities.

Formal institutions can be made more effective by adhering to and fulfilling the six clear attributes explained by Ostrom (2010) regarding local community operations based on trust, consent, and mutual agreement among CPR members. In this sense, it should also be recognized that informal institutions play a vital role in the management and use of CPR and thus are equally important stakeholders to the State and the mining

companies in the difficult and complex decisions about mining and development in these communities. As these communities have traditionally managed the CPR in a sustainable manner, it is important for the State and mining companies to assume some of the attributes of members of these communities by adhering to these guidelines. This seems to be one of the best proven ways, theoretically and empirically, to generate progress, trust, and legitimization within the community and among all stakeholders and thereby ensure the best chance for economic success and prosperity.

Indigenous communities have quite a different organization that includes traditional and modern mixed components within the political organizations such as democratic votes, offices of authority, regular assemblies, etc., making it a customary form of political organization. Meetings, land management, and assemblies are a part of customary organization that is often not recognized by formal rules or institutions. In particular, indigenous communities are characterized by their own ethics and rules and thus have different perceptions of what informality means. However, Helmke and Levitsky (2004) have formulated some of the key elements of the contrast of the interaction between informal institutions and effective versus ineffective formal institutions. This framework shows that these communities are more likely to see economic prosperity if they can work with effective informal institutions towards common goals. To this end, the State should work to make their institutions for mining more effective by making them more responsive and accepting of following the political rules and norms of the communities in which they operate.

Additionally, as Williams (2012) and Arellano (2008) mentioned in their studies, the lack of capacity of the State to create and enforce laws *vis a vis* companies that are operating in Peru is often because they favor neoliberal investment, and thus the mechanisms to control the law over those companies are weak. In this context, informal rules and procedures of these communities make the changes and demand that formal rules be put in practice. As both communities rely on informal and formal institutions that produce rules to manage the resources and society in these communities, it is also important to recognize that the concept of "informal" institutions is a foreign idea to these communities, as these communities have been organized this way since before the colonial times. Furthermore, the idea of the "formal" institution has only been defined as it relates to modern institutions. Then can we call the institutions of the Inca Empire formal as well? In this case, these communities have always followed certain formal and informal rules through their political evolution until today. This ability to adapt local institutions to larger non-local institutions over time has enabled the survival of many aspects of Quechua CPO. In the recent context of the entrance of international companies to these communities, the village and *locale* assemblies have helped dictate how and under which conditions these companies can operate.

According to many historical references and the nature of their institutions, governments have certain interests to regulate and control economic interests within their geographical boundaries. The incentive in recent decades to formalize informal organizations is due to the economic interest in control over resources. As mining companies seek investments in these communities, the formal institutions of the

government have a major interest in the inclusion of specific laws and recognition of these communities to ameliorate social conflict and provide less of a barrier to the entrance of the mining investment in these areas. Because the central government controls taxes levied on the mining operations, but does not distribute them equally, and the state government has been focusing on economic interests that make it easier for corporations to co-opt the government and force them to defend the interests of the corporation over citizens of local communities, the local village assemblies are not in a strong position to confront the State and multinational mining corporations. Instead, the unique shield the community has maintained is their CPO, which has included the migrant communities. However, as was clear from my interviews, the formal institutions of the State have attempted to create and implement all forms of rules and procedures to sanction any informal rules that encourage interaction between migrants and their village. Because the main economic investment in Peru is heavily dominated by the mining industry, the formal institutions of the government often help to generate a platform to support foreign companies' investments and protect their interests, which are not necessarily the interests of the communities. The lack of capacity (or desire) by the government to guarantee the well-being of these communities is one of the main challenges of the central government. The economic development process is thus often implemented by ineffective formal institutions that not only operate in a top-down fashion, but often neglect their duty to advocate on behalf of indigenous communities. The inability of the Peruvian government to regulate and control the companies efficiently (and because it appears that is not in their best interest to do so), has reduced

citizens' trust in government and has caused many communities to take on substitutive roles in advocating for their own proper financial compensation, environmental concerns, and land management rights and inheritance (Arellano, 2008). Still, even if the State were to take on a more effective role as a formal institution in advocating for these communities, we must ask the question: would it really change the economic development outcome as Pejovich (1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004) claim?

Norberg-Hodge (1991) analyzed this question in her book about a Tibetan village in Ladakh, a village that underwent nearly the same process of change that have happened to the villages of this study, only in a different context. Economic development, in the traditional material sense of the term, by a population with no outside influence can require generations. However, with the active intervention of the State and international companies the process can be much more rapid. Perhaps they can help to improve the economic viability of a region; but this does not necessarily guarantee that peoples' standard of living will improve. These controversial issues are still an active part of the academic debate and deserve further investigation and analysis. Is the loss of values and culture worth development? More practically, how can standard of living increase while still encouraging and enriching local practices, customs, and concerns? What is the role of formal and informal institutions in this regard? And how can a balance between economic development based on mining and the political independence, social values, and cultural well-being of the Andean indigenous communities benefit all actors in this conflict?

According to my data, both communities studied here have developed strong connections as a network with their migrant communities, reproducing their own rules and statutes. Perhaps this connection with migrant communities can develop positive outcomes for the community. In the context of indigenous communities in the developing world, analysis of formal and informal institutions as separate and divergent institutions leads to missing some of the key elements that make connections between these types of institutions more holistic. This leads to the theory of institutional bricolage that examines the different process and arrangement of the rules that communities develop through time.

Bricolage

"Bricolage addresses the plurality and the complex political dimensions of knowledge work" (Rogers, 2012. p. 14). This research attempted to understand the complexity of the political organization of the villages and *locales* without separating these institutions from the State government and mining negotiations. Instead, this research has attempted to provide the perspective of the communities as a holistic body, disagreements among members included. Thus, the concept of bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) can enhance the theory of effective and ineffective formal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) by expanding on the potential relationships within and between institutions that are neither formal nor informal in the traditional sense such as is often the case with indigenous communities. Additionally, this understanding can help to identify certain patterns that could help to predict political changes in the future such as

how the relationships between villages, *locales*, the central government, and international mining companies will transform in future contexts.

In sum, these communities and villages consider their assemblies as important institutions for the reproduction of knowledge and in the best interest of the democratic participation in the decision-making process for the well-being of the community. Furthermore, those rules can change depending on the context of the participants and decision-making arrived at in the manner of consensus. They consider the assemblies as the maximum authority, which enables them to solve any communal problem. In this process, the theory of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) combined with the theory of effective/ineffective formal/informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999; Helmke & Levitsky, 2004) can help us to understand how the processes of organization between these institutions function, what components can be modified and reused according to certain circumstances, and to what degree the relationships between the actors previously mentioned will be beneficial for all involved or not. Both communities and their migrant communities have a dynamic organization that interconnects them. These institutions are constantly changing and trying to maintain themselves meanwhile customary components of their own rules and sociocultural norms are in flux. Their own communal experience and customary way of managing their own institutions has helped interconnect these communities allowing them to confront their challenges. The theory of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) can help us to understand as a holistic concept how formal and informal institutions can experience transformation.

Land management

Customary forms of land management have direct influence on the customary political organization (CPO) of these communities and vice versa. These communities' form of CPO has been evolving through time and space until today alongside with land and natural resource management. The rules and procedures designed by CPO are based on the structure, function, reuse, implementation, and practice of customary land and natural resource management. Both communities have similar resources and forms of land management that have been maintained for millennia. Thus, CPO has had an important influence on land and natural resources management. As the customary land management has been maintained, reused, and implemented over time in different historical contexts, it can help to identify patterns of practice of sustainable land management that can share similarities with other ancient practices in other places. In other words, if the community did not have control of their communally held land, the type of political organization involved would have a different direction, structure, procedure, and components. This type of land management that is still practiced in both communities directly influences the way CPO was established.

Ostrom's (2008) eight principles for managing common pool resources resonate with the land management in both these communities. All the principles are practiced in these communities. Here, we can analyze some of the most important principles that are crucial to understand the importance of land management such as: the definite group boundaries that are essential for the customary communities, rule-making by and for

community members, recognition of these rules by outside authorities, and a system to monitor and sanction offending members.

Define clear group boundaries

This first principle, according to the internal community statute, seems to be quite clear with group boundaries very clearly explained. Within this statute there also appears a process for accepting outsiders into the community as full members; however, these new members need to agree to follow the rules and requirements of the community. According to the rules of the *statute* people who want to be incorporated in the community need to have the intention to work communally in the fields with no commercial purpose. As a community leader explained, *"When people come here, if they are from another village and they want land to live on and work they will request this in an assembly. Yes, they will provide it, but they must agree to follow the rules of the community with taking advantage of the resources of the community."*

Rules by community members and for community members

The governing rules of the community that each member must follow are directly related to the common goods in order to manage, organize and control the land and society. These rules are agreed to by the people according to their necessities and situational context. Thus, these rules can be constantly in a state of change over time. Often rules are implemented, reformed, abandoned, and sometimes reused in the best interest of the community, as the theory of bricolage suggests. Furthermore, aside from the evolution of these rules not being static over time, they were also not created by a

small group in power, instead these rules are maintained by the constant participation of all the members of the community. This not only provides members with ability to change these rules to best fit their interest, but it also provides a platform for very real direct democracy in plenitude over the decisions made about the communal rules.

Rule-making rights of community members are respected by outside authorities

Both communities in this study are recognized by national law as peasant communities that rely on their own autonomy and administration over the land. In these processes of negotiation the stakeholders are the corporations, the state, and the communities. The Peruvian government in 1993, in middle of a heated national debate about land and resource rights, established that between the subsoil and the topsoil (surface) the land belongs to the communities that have long been established there, but below the subsoil, where most mined minerals are located, all resources officially belong to the state. Today, this means that the state government of Peru has control of the subsoil resources, while the topsoil resources are controlled and maintained by private and community land owners. This controversial situation has added to conflicts between external corporations, mostly mining and oil companies, and the indigenous people who have lived in the places where these resources exist for millennia. Ultimately, the changes wrought in 1993 by the state have made them the owners of everything in the subsoil and below even if the surface of the land is owned as common property by the community

(Amado, 2010). As the result of these differing rights and interests the mining operations can lead to clientelism and manipulation.

System to monitor and sanction offending community members

As mentioned in the Results Chapter, the reciprocal community work such as *ayni* and *minka* has been dramatically abandoned by certain segments of the communities due to the mining operations. This has caused many changes to people's behavior, including economic changes and work habit changes due to the influence of mining. The principles of common pool resource management (Ostrom, 1990) have thus been altered because of outsiders coming to the village for work, eventual corruption of the authorities, and final mistrust of the authorities by the community (See Table 15). The self-governance model thus required by the assembly was strained and this caused difficulty in the maintenance of community land management rules and norms. As evidenced by the conflict of Parajinos detailed in the Results chapter.

The monitoring process, especially for land management, such as the use of a *camayok* as described in the Literature Review Chapter, is used to check the behavior of all community members and their belongings (e.g. animals, tools, water canals, etc.) as they are used on the communal lands. If there are abuses, the offending member will be sanctioned at the following village assembly. However, it is important to recognize that through time the traditional authorities have lost much of their respect and their ability to enforce and to organize and correct socially bad or impermissible behavior (e.g. theft, abuse, cheating, etc.). These changes have been weakening the CPO rules and sanctions

due to the inevitable influence of globalization, which allows connectivity of the villagers and migrant communities to new ideas and technology. In just a short time these changes have come to strongly influence village politics. Without any place of contestation or time to reflect on what values of the sanctions, rules, and conditions are that need to be maintained the question should be asked: how will land management change into the future due to the pressures of neoliberalism and mining?

In sum, Ostrom's common pool resource management principles fit well the model of land management and political structure of the communities in this research. However, these principles are changing rapidly in recent decades since the mining operation in these areas and as the lack of the capacity of the State to recognize and support communities has generated less trust and hope in the effectiveness of formal institutions (See Table 15). Furthermore, through this research comes the question about whether autonomous communities with communally held land can really exist into the coming future age of expanded neoliberalism without any political, administrative, or economic intervention by the government. Ostrom's (2010) principles of polycentric governance and microsituational level analysis can help to illuminate generally how communities organize and manage their resources through building complex, interrelated, trusting relationships among members. This concept of "trust" within the framework of collective action theory is seen as highly important by Poteete, Janssen, and Ostrom (2010) and something the State needs to understand in order to recognize and include these communities' rules and norms in the management of these commons. However, in States where the formal institutions of the government lack the capacity to regulate and

control efficiently the resources and corporate responsibilities of international communities, does the community then need to assume these responsibilities? What requirements does the community need to do so?

Table 15: Five attributes (Ostrom 2010) applied to mining negotiations with villages

Attributes	Problem	Recommendations
Open communication	Lack of communication between different stake holders	**a)** Affected communities' (villages and *locales*) opinions should be heard, valued, and advocated for by the State when in negotiation with mining companies. **b)** State needs more effective formal institutions to work with local communities and regulate mining operations.
Known reputations	Lack of knowledge of mining companies' operations	**a)** Encourage and facilitate the meeting of community members from previous mining operations when a new mine begins. **b)** Create more comprehensive and publicly available data on all mining operations in the country and provide it to new mining communities.
High marginal per capita return	Canon *minero*	The canon *minero* should be reviewed for unequal distribution based on proximity to mine and economic status.
Long term vision	No plans for local manufacturing, all raw materials for export	**a)** The State should implement laws that methodically convert Peru's mercantilist economy into one of manufacturing, requiring certain quantities of raw material from foreign mining companies to be sold at a near-cost value to Peruvian manufacturers. **b)** Develop plans to maintain the traditional agricultural lifestyle and geography of the Andes as mining increases.
Sanctions system	Informal sanctions often go unrecognized by the State	Develop further recognition of local sanctions against mining companies to deter abuses and conflict.

Geographic Scale of Mining Consultation and CSR

The negotiation process of the mining operation requires stakeholders' participation that is often coerced by political and economic influences. As a result, the negotiation process relies on the favor of interest groups that often take advantage of this process. Furthermore, this kind of negotiation can end up embroiled in conflict and disagreement between different groups of interest. Thus, the communities are more vulnerable, and all actors benefit less from these types of compromised processes. In Muradian et al. (2003) the question is posed about the ideal geographic scale for mining negotiation participation. In addition, they make the prediction that, "...any method for decision making not relying mainly on local laypeople participation would likely prolong conflicts across time, increasing the probability of local violent protests and weakening local institutions" (Muradian et al. 2003, p. 790).

This thesis research agrees with Muradian et al. (2003) that it is vitally important to consider *primarily* the views of villagers where the mine will be located. However, it also suggests that *secondarily* the surrounding villagers from neighboring villages that will be affected, and *thirdly* the *locales* from each of these villages that exists in the major populated cities around Peru, but principally Lima, should also be consulted in this process to assure "legitimized" acceptance of the outcome (Muradian et al. 2003). An example of this is the difference between Calcauso's and Mollebamba's negotiation processes with the mining companies.

In Calcauso the negotiation process was difficult and strained, but because of the accepted input of the village assembly, surrounding villages, and the migrant community the final decision was agreed upon in the summer of 2017. This decision to allow the first phase of exploration has largely been viewed as "legitimate", even though some people are still against the final decision as is evidenced by my research results. This, while in Mollebamba only the village assembly was consulted, leaving out the secondary circles (surrounding villages) and tertiary circles (*locales)* of influence and decision-making in the negotiation process. This resulted in not only a bad deal for Mollebamba, but also the protest by surrounding villages at their assembly in 2008, and the land conflict at Parajinos in 2014, all described in the Results Chapter. Each time these conflicts appeared, Mollebamba had to halt the mining operations, consult with the surrounding villages and their own *locale* in Lima, and renegotiate the contract with the mine. This process took many years away from all the stakeholders' time and efforts. It is yet to be seen whether Calcauso's negotiation will be longer-lasting than initial negotiations by Mollebamba. However; the prospect of accepting input from secondary and tertiary spheres of influence is a positive development.

Chapter 6: Limitations, Future Research and Conclusion

As a member of these communities, I tried to develop a thesis that could give practical suggestions to the current situation surrounding negotiation with the mining companies. As a member of my community told me in the interview, the mining will happen, it could be now or later, but it will come eventually because these resources historically have been necessary for the society and industry. Many of them asked how I could help them in this situation and I thought that a key element of future success in this regard would be to first develop a greater understanding about their own political organization and function and how these organizations negotiate with the mining companies. This would then allow me to explore alternatives these communities might have to negotiate more beneficial deals with mining companies in the future.

Limitations and Future Research

A limitation of this study was the lack of in-depth economic analysis of both formal and informal institutions and how people benefit or not from current mining policy. Because I did not obtain the raw financial records of profits, losses, and investments of the mining companies in these areas, it is difficult to tell how favorable these investments have been for them. Future economic research should focus on the influence, appropriateness, and distribution of the *canon minero* (government tax on

mining) because this was a principal point of discussion among authors (Arellano, 2008; Zavalla, 2004; Hinojosa, 2011).

Future research must also expand its geographic scope. Until now, most research has only focused on one or a handful of communities. A large-scale mixed-methods study in the future that compares various factors among many communities affected by mining would be extremely valuable for the field. In future, research could focus on health and nutrition, educational and socioeconomic improvement, the generation and gender gap in perspectives on mining and positions of authority in the communities, and the conditions under which families continue working the land successfully after mining companies arrive. These factors are important to analyze to understand and evaluate the significant changes that are taking place in these communities because of neoliberal mining practices.

Moreover, research in the future should pay particular attention to the standard of living increase (or not) of communities affected by mining and the psychological pressure to modernize to understand the cost-benefit of mining operations for these communities (Norberg-Hodge, 1991). These types of studies are important because it is not yet clear that the outcome of development through neoliberal mining practices will necessarily ensure the well-being of the people and their socio-environmental context as compared with their own CPO. These topics should be investigated further by various fields of study to assure that the primary stakeholders, the villages and *locales*, are properly benefitting from the use of their land and resources in this manner. Specifically, future research needs to focus on unpacking the informal institutions of the indigenous

communities and reconciling them with effective formal institutions to provide proper CPR management that is accepted and administered by the local communities, especially in situations like mining where extraction takes so much investment of money and labor. If these major projects are going to happen either way, by following the attributes of microsituations explained by Ostrom (2010), formal institutions could learn how to properly incorporate local knowledge, authority, and decision-making within the framework of their development projects, this will ensure a more complimentary relationship between the informal and formal institutions of the region and thereby bring more evenly widespread economic prosperity.

Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to show the influence of customary political organization (CPO) on the experiences of two indigenous Quechua communities as they negotiated entry of mining operations onto their lands and into their communities. This study utilized grounded theory and a mixed-methods approach to obtain relevant data, and analyzed these data based on various theories and concepts by authors in the fields of indigenous studies, political science, environmental science, geography, and ecology. There were several main findings in this thesis. This included the unique structure of CPO in these communities and the differences between villages in the negotiation processes with mining companies. These negotiations and mining in general were perceived differently according to the community demographics and impacted the resulting mining negotiations. The results highlighted the need for recognition of local knowledge and common pool resource (CPR) governance strategies by formal institutions in order to help create more effective connections with informal institutions. Of course, focusing on just increasing investments with a centralized state government without having enough control and regulation can have devastating consequences. In the Peruvian case, inefficiency of the State distribution programs for mining taxes makes the canon minero (taxes) often increase social conflicts rather than decrease them in the long term in the communities that are the most affected. These communities are in the first stage of the mining operations and it was important to acknowledge in this research how

and in which conditions mining arrived in these communities and how the political organization of the community responded to these external actors through their customary organization.

These findings in the current study relatively concurred with those of Pejovich (1999) and Helmke and Levitsky (2004). This is in regard to the informal institutions and their role under effective or ineffective governance by the State, however it was important to add the concept of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2012; Rogers, 2012) to the analysis. Institutional bricolage suggested a more holistic approach to the understanding of "informal" and "formal" institutions, and how the State in the case of Peru could play a more active role in its protection and assistance to communities negotiating with large multinational mining companies. Furthermore, these findings identified the same four characteristics for indigenous peoplehood as suggested by Thomas (1990) and Holm et al. (2003) to be existing in these communities, even though the people there were largely unaware or misinformed about the word *indigenous.* Most importantly, this study recognized that the migrants who are not currently living in their traditional lands, but speak the Quechua language, participate in traditional festivities and ceremonies, and are connected to traditional history, are also included in this model of peoplehood. Ostrom's (2008) eight principles for common pool resource management were also found to be present in these villages. Six of the eight principles were elaborated on while asking the question whether these communities need to assume a larger role in regulating multinational mining companies arriving in their communities due to the ineffective formal institutions of the State. Finally, in response to Muradian et al. (2003)

this research has suggested that not only should the primary village (or villages) affected by a mine be consulted in the negotiation process, but also the surrounding villages and their migrant communities. This should help ameliorate potential problems, equalize the benefits for all potential stakeholders, and ensure that after negotiations take place, there is less conflict due to a higher amount of legitimization of the process. This is achieved by including these important stakeholders as equal members at the negotiating table.

This comparative case study explained the context of the expansion of the mining industry. Within the first phase of negotiation with the mining companies in these villages, without even having started the operation yet, it already has created immense social conflict. I highly suggest deeper study from the political comparative field to understand in which conditions the formal and informal rules play an important role in shaping their interaction with formal institutions, particularly focusing on the attributes of CPR management (Ostrom, E., 2010). I also urge future research into the importance of including migrant communities in some capacity at the negotiation table; in addition, the importance of the political organization of the migrant communities in urban areas and how they help shape the political structure in the village. This kind of network based primarily on family ties has emerged as a strong modern political force. This is due to the influence of migration and the self-determination and autonomy between villages and *locales.* The way in which they have controlled and managed their resources have guided them through their own ways of development throughout a long and challenging history.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Pearson Correlation Results for Village Survey SPSS Analysis

Dependent Variable	Ind. Variables	Pearson Correlation
Do you identify as indigenous	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.283
Have you ever had a position of authority in the village?	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.328 | -.208
How often Do you participate in the village assembly	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.181
Last Question: Row 2 (Political Organization affects mining negotiations)	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.21
Villagers should have more political authority than residents in Lima over local politics	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	-0.165
Last Question: Row 3 (Residents should participate in village politics)	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.146 | -.165
Last Question: Row 7 (Village authorities work for the interest of the people))	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.13
Last Question Row 1 (Mining is a good opportunity for the community.	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	.153 | -.151
land titling is beneficial for the community	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	-0.217
Mining is the only form of development for the population	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	0.173
Mining causes social divisions in the community	Gender, Age, Village of Origin, Ever lived in the city	.112 | -.115

Appendix B: Pearson Correlation Results for Locale Survey SPSS Analysis

Dependent Variable	Ind. Variables	Pearson Correlation
Authorities work for the benefit of the village	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	0.578
12. If your answer is yes, how often you participate in meetings or gatherings of residents?	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	-0.545
14. Have you had a position of authority in the political organization of residents in the place where you are	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	-0.69
20. Choose whether you 2 or 4 with the following statements. (9 alternative answers) [The mining operation is a good opportunity for our community]	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	-0.292
Land Titling is beneficial for the community	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	.360 | .332
Mine causes Social divisions	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	0.318
Participation in village assemblies	Gender, Age, Village of Origin	-0.41

Appendix C: Random Partcipant List

Location:	Research	House Number:	Location:	Research	House Number:
Calcauso	Interview	3	Mollebamba	Interview	17
Calcauso	Interview	12	Mollebamba	Interview	18
Calcauso	Interview	30	Mollebamba	Interview	35
Calcauso	Interview	38	Mollebamba	Interview	61
Calcauso	Interview	62	Mollebamba	Interview	63
Calcauso	Interview	66	Mollebamba	Interview	93
Calcauso	Interview	84	Mollebamba	Interview	106
Calcauso	Interview	86	Mollebamba	Interview	112
Calcauso	Interview	90	Mollebamba	Interview	132
Calcauso	Interview	95	Mollebamba	Interview	138
Calcauso	Interview	96	Mollebamba	Interview	158
Calcauso	Interview	103	Mollebamba	Interview	161
Calcauso	Interview	109	Mollebamba	Interview	163
Calcauso	Interview	121	Mollebamba	Interview	182
Calcauso	Interview	142	Mollebamba	Interview	199
Calcauso	Survey	1	Mollebamba	Survey	9
Calcauso	Survey	3	Mollebamba	Survey	21
Calcauso	Survey	5	Mollebamba	Survey	28
Calcauso	Survey	8	Mollebamba	Survey	30
Calcauso	Survey	9	Mollebamba	Survey	31
Calcauso	Survey	12	Mollebamba	Survey	38
Calcauso	Survey	15	Mollebamba	Survey	39
Calcauso	Survey	17	Mollebamba	Survey	48
Calcauso	Survey	19	Mollebamba	Survey	56
Calcauso	Survey	21	Mollebamba	Survey	57
Calcauso	Survey	23	Mollebamba	Survey	58
Calcauso	Survey	25	Mollebamba	Survey	63
Calcauso	Survey	27	Mollebamba	Survey	68

Location:	Research	House Number:	Location:	Research	House Number:
Calcauso	Survey	30	Mollebamba	Survey	69
Calcauso	Survey	32	Mollebamba	Survey	73
Calcauso	Survey	34	Mollebamba	Survey	77
Calcauso	Survey	39	Mollebamba	Survey	78
Calcauso	Survey	46	Mollebamba	Survey	81
Calcauso	Survey	48	Mollebamba	Survey	83
Calcauso	Survey	50	Mollebamba	Survey	86
Calcauso	Survey	58	Mollebamba	Survey	91
Calcauso	Survey	60	Mollebamba	Survey	94
Calcauso	Survey	61	Mollebamba	Survey	105
Calcauso	Survey	63	Mollebamba	Survey	106
Calcauso	Survey	69	Mollebamba	Survey	108
Calcauso	Survey	70	Mollebamba	Survey	117
Calcauso	Survey	72	Mollebamba	Survey	118
Calcauso	Survey	74	Mollebamba	Survey	119
Calcauso	Survey	75	Mollebamba	Survey	123
Calcauso	Survey	81	Mollebamba	Survey	126
Calcauso	Survey	84	Mollebamba	Survey	129
Calcauso	Survey	87	Mollebamba	Survey	132
Calcauso	Survey	91	Mollebamba	Survey	135
Calcauso	Survey	92	Mollebamba	Survey	136
Calcauso	Survey	93	Mollebamba	Survey	149
Calcauso	Survey	102	Mollebamba	Survey	150
Calcauso	Survey	104	Mollebamba	Survey	152
Calcauso	Survey	110	Mollebamba	Survey	155
Calcauso	Survey	111	Mollebamba	Survey	156
Calcauso	Survey	115	Mollebamba	Survey	157
Calcauso	Survey	120	Mollebamba	Survey	164
Calcauso	Survey	121	Mollebamba	Survey	168

Location:	Research	House Number:	Location:	Research	House Number:
Calcauso	Survey	129	Mollebamba	Survey	178
Calcauso	Survey	131	Mollebamba	Survey	180
Calcauso	Survey	134	Mollebamba	Survey	182
Calcauso	Survey	136	Mollebamba	Survey	183
Calcauso	Survey	138	Mollebamba	Survey	190
Calcauso	Survey	139	Mollebamba	Survey	194
Calcauso	Survey	146	Mollebamba	Survey	196
Calcauso	Survey	148	Mollebamba	Survey	198

Appendix D: National Statistical Service Sample Size Calculator